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I. INTRODUCTION
The line between tort and contract law has never been definitively
drawn, especially when it comes to product liability law and construc-
tion law. In some instances, the theories have become so intertwined
that practitioners have adopted the nomenclature of "contort" to des-
ignate claims that contain both theories of tort and contract.2 In an
attempt to keep the line between contract claims and tort claims dis-
tinguishable, most states have adopted some form of the Commercial
Loss Doctrine.3 Originally applied in product liability cases, the tradi-
2. GRAr GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CoNTRAcr 90 (1974).
3. See Miller v. United States Steel Corp., 902 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1990). Judge Posner of
the Seventh Circuit pointed out that we should use the term "commercial loss" rather than "eco-
nomic loss" to describe this concept. He states, "[ilt would be better to call it a 'commercial
loss,' not only because personal injuries and especially property losses are economic losses, too
- they destroy values which can be and are monetized - but also, and more important, because
tort law is a superfluous and inapt tool for resolving purely commercial disputes. We have a
body of law designed for such disputes. It is called contract law." Id. I think this conceptualiza-
tion and nomenclature clears up a lot of the confusion that has arisen as Illinois courts apply the
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tional Commercial Loss Doctrine holds that when a product is defec-
tive, a party may not recover in tort unless the defect causes personal
injury or damage to property other than the product itself and does so
via a sudden and calamitous event.4 I will refer to this definition as
the traditional Commercial Loss Doctrine or traditional Moorman
doctrine throughout this paper. However, much of the confusion in
the application of the Commercial Loss Doctrine stems from the fact
that this definition only applies to product liability law and not to
other areas of law, such as service contracts or construction contracts.
I will attempt to make two arguments in this article. Part I of this
article argues that when courts need to determine whether the Com-
mercial Loss Doctrine applies, they should not begin by asking
whether the loss is "economic." Instead, the court should analyze
whether the duties between the parties arose via the contract between
the parties or via extra-contractual duties which govern the relation-
ship between the parties. If the latter, then tort claims should be al-
lowed. In determining whether extra-contractual duties exist, courts
must articulate rational or historical policy reasons for the existence of
such duties. Part V of this article argues that the Commercial Loss
Doctrine should be applied to bar tort claims in the construction in-
dustry because the policy reasons for allowing tort claims in product
liability cases do not apply in the construction industry.
A. The Policy of Tort Law Versus the Policy of Contract Law
To really understand the Commercial Loss Doctrine, and the argu-
ments made herein, one must have a basic understanding of the differ-
ence between tort theory and contract theory. This is because the
legal policy of contract law differs dramatically from the public policy
of tort law. Contract law is based upon the theory that two parties can
allocate certain risks of a transaction among themselves as they so
choose; there is very little concern for general public policy. 5 Tort law,
on the other hand, is based upon the theory that society has deemed it
appropriate that people exercise due care in their interaction with
others, whether there is a contractual relationship or not, and a breach
Commercial Loss Doctrine to different industries, and therefore I will refer to the Commercial
Loss Doctrine in this article.
4. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. 1982).
5. Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1285-87
(1990). Herein I am referring to classical contract theory, which is the body of law usually asso-
ciated with Holmes, Williston, and the original Restatement of Contracts. However, as Mr.
Feinman points out, even classic contract theory is based somewhat on public policy concerns as
courts have to interpret, fill gaps, and even impose pre-contractual and quasi-contractual liability
that are not bargained for.
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of this duty should leave the tortfeasor liable to the party that in-
curred injury.6 This is a social policy deemed necessary to disperse the
cost of injuries; it has nothing to do with two people contracting via
mutual intent for some product or service.7 Therefore, contract law is
premised on the mutual intent of the parties, whereas tort law is de-
rived from the social policy that courts and legislatures through the
years have deemed to be good for society, i.e., that people owe each
other a duty of due care in their relations with one another.
B. The Genealogy of Product Liability Laws
Given this conceptualization of tort law, it is easier to follow the
genealogy of product liability law, starting with the fact that the sale of
goods was traditionally governed by contract law and the mutual in-
tent of the buyer and seller." Therefore, to maintain a claim against
the seller, the plaintiff had to be in "contractual privity" with the
seller, which typically meant a party to the contract. 9 However, in
many instances, a party that was not in privity with the manufacturer
would become injured by a product, such as in the case of contami-
nated food or poisons, and courts did not believe it was just to leave
such a victim remediless due to a lack of contractual privity with the
manufacturer or producer of the product.10 Therefore, in various ju-
risdictions throughout England and America, courts began to devise
ways to allow tort claims for defective products to be brought by per-
sons who were injured by that product but were not in contractual
privity with the product's manufacturer."
For instance, in the United States, implied warranties were created
by courts over the concern for the physical damage contaminated food
could do to people, whether they were in privity with the seller or not,
and whether there was proof of negligence or not.12 In essence, this
was the origin of strict product liability tort claims, but the courts
termed these "implied warranty" claims.' 3 In England, a court found
6. Id. at 1286.
7. This is of course a dramatic oversimplification of the origins and theory of tort law, for
which, to this day, there is no consensus. For a full discussion of tort theory, see MARK
GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUcr LIABILITY (2006).
8. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 408 (N.Y. 1852).
9. George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modem Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 461 (1985).
10. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
11. See GEISTFELD, supra note 7, at 20-26 (explaining the development of product liability law
in Anglo-American jurisprudence).
12. Id. at 22-24.
13. William L. Prosser, The Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099, 1104 (1960).
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that a defendant not in contractual privity with the plaintiff could
nonetheless be held liable in tort for general negligence for selling a
bottle of mislabeled poison that put a person's health in danger be-
cause the product was "inherently dangerous." 1 4 This rationale was
soon applied to all products whether "inherently dangerous" or not,'5
and was soon thereafter applied to all products without the need to
prove negligence, thus creating strict liability law.16 Thus, another
policy rationale for product liability tort claims was born, doing away
forever with the contractual privity requirement between the buyer
and seller.
The one thing all product liability claims had in common, whether
strict liability, negligent liability, or implied warranty, was that they
were court-created remedies based upon public policy concerns for
the health and welfare of consumers who were not in privity with
manufacturers in a modern mass market created by industrialization.' 7
The Restatement (Second) makes clear that "[t]he basis for the [strict
liability] rule is the ancient one of the special responsibility for the
safety of the public undertaken by one who enters into the business of
supplying human beings with products which may endanger safety of
their person[ ] . . . ."1s Most courts have held that these are the justifi-
cations for holding manufacturers liable in tort: (1) the manufacturer
has placed the product into the stream of commerce to make a profit,
and thus should be responsible for its defects; and (2) in a mass mar-
ket, the cost of injuries resulting from a defective product should be
borne by the manufacturer, rather than the party who suffered the
loss.19 Furthermore, a manufacturer is in the best position to prevent
product defects thus increasing general societal safety, and is also in
the best position to compensate those who are injured.20
14. GEISTFELD, supra note 7, at 19-20.
15. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1054-55.
16. GEISTFELD, supra note 7, at 22.
17. Id. at 19-26. The issue is even more complicated, as some legal scholars believe that the
doctrine of implied warranty is not a contract doctrine, but instead was derived from tort princi-
pals and thus is a tort doctrine. The lines have never been definitively drawn. Id.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (1965).
19. GEISTFELD, supra note 7, at 21-26.
20. In essence, the manufacturer acts like an insurance company in which all buyers of the
product have paid a little extra for the product (one could imagine the increase in price as an
insurance premium) so that when one consumer is hurt, that consumer will not be left without
financial recompense for his damages.
2010] 343
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C. The Plaintiffs' Bar Attempts to Expand Tort Law and the
"Birth" of the Commercial Loss Doctrine
Strict product liability was adopted in 1969 by the Illinois Supreme
Court in the Suvada case, although negligent product liability and im-
plied warranty claims were in existence before that time.21 Once strict
and negligent product liability laws were established for defective
products, it only seemed logical that plaintiffs' attorneys would at-
tempt to bring tort claims for defective products, even if the only dam-
age was to the product itself. This is because most contract claims do
not allow for the open-ended recovery that the tort system allows for,
and most contract claims have bargained-for limitations on what can
be recovered and when.22 This is where the Commercial Loss Doc-
trine began to appear in litigation. Plaintiffs' counsel began to take
the narrow exception that allowed for tort claims for defective prod-
ucts that caused injuries to persons or property and began trying to
broaden the tort claims to encompass damage to the product itself,
which was traditionally governed by contractual rules.23 These claims
were brought when the "defective" product did not cause any injury
or damage to other persons or property, but instead merely failed to
perform as was bargained for. To combat this assault on contract law,
defendants had to argue that when the only damage is to the product
itself, there is no rational policy for allowing a tort claim the way there
is when a person or other property is damaged by the defective prod-
uct. Thus, the remedy should be restricted to contract law.2 4 This was
the birth of the Commercial Loss Doctrine.
The policy behind the Commercial Loss Doctrine, as explained by
the Supreme Court of the United States, is to prevent contract law
from drowning in a "sea of tort."25 Without such a rule almost all
contractual remedies, which still require privity, would be rendered
meaningless, as consumers could simply bring tort cases. In East
River, the Supreme Court reasoned that when a person is injured, a
tort remedy is appropriate because the cost of injury may be over-
whelming, and the person would not be prepared to meet such a
21. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 185-86 (Ill. 1965).
22. See, e.g., William C. Way, The Problem of Economic Damages: Reconceptualizing the
Moorman Doctrine, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 1169, 1171-73 (1991).
23. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. 1982); E. River S.S. Corp. v.
Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 870-71 (1986); Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal.
1965).
24. See Moorman, 435 N.E.2d 443; E. River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 870-71; Seely, 403 P.2d 145.
25. E. River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 866.
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cost. 2 6 However, when the product "injures" only itself, society has
determined that consumers do not need the extra protection of tort
law because consumers can willingly bargain for contractual warranty
protections. 27 In essence, the Commercial Loss Doctrine protects the
freedom of commercial parties to "allocate economic risk of defect,
deterioration or failure of the product, between themselves by con-
tract, which in turn allows the commercial purchaser, who is best
suited to assess the risk of economic loss, to assume or insure against
the risk of defect through bargaining for product warranties." 28 Fur-
thermore, without the Commercial Loss Doctrine, the practice of bar-
gaining for and paying a higher price for express warranties, or for
limiting implied warranties, would no longer be an effective method
for two parties to allocate who should bear certain risks regarding the
longevity and quality of a product.29 This would make manufacturers
insurers of the economic quality of their products, in essence offering
warranties for the duration of the applicable statute of limitations of
product liability law.
As can be seen, the Commercial Loss Doctrine is based upon the
very confusing intersection of tort and contract law, which is troubling
enough; however, the problem of conceptualizing the Commercial
Loss Doctrine has been made even more nebulous because most
26. Id. at 866-67 (indicating that this is the public policy rationale for allowing tort claims in
traditional product cases).
27. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 9, at 492-93.
28. Id. One of the most confusing aspects of drawing a line between tort law and contract law
is the fact that most commentators believe that tort law should be permissible for product de-
fects that cause personal injury or damage to other property because manufacturers are best
suited to prevent the defects and compensate consumers. See Richard C. Ausness, An Insur-
ance-Based Compensation System for Product-Related Injuries, 58 U. Prrr. L. REV. 669, 671
(1997); Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An'Approach to Nonfault Allocation of
Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965); see also Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribu-
tion and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961). This is due to the fact that manufacturers can
act like a giant insurance company that charges a premium for coverage, i.e., raising the price of
the product by some percentage, so that when one person is injured that person will be compen-
sated by the other purchasers via the premiums paid. Richard C. Ausness, An Insurance-Based
Compensation System for Product-Related Injuries, 58 U. Prrr. L. REV. 669, 671 (1997). Is it not
true that the same reasoning applies to defective products that merely fail but do not cause
injury to other persons or property? Instead of each person negotiating individually and paying
extra for a warranty that will protect their product if it fails, why should not society do away with
product warranties and have the manufacturer raise the price on all the products so that they can
act as an insurer for any product that proves to be defective?
29. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (2004) (permitting parties to a sates contract to limit warranties in any
reasonable manner, or to agree that the buyer possesses no warranty protection at all. The par-
ties can also agree to exclude the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness if they do so
in writing, or modify the implied warranty by clear and conspicuous language.); U.C.C. § 2-719
(2004) (allowing parties to exclude or restrict remedies for consequential damages resulting from
commercial losses (but not from personal injury)).
346 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL
courts, commentators, and practitioners speak in a somewhat Orwel-
lian manner when addressing the issue.30 The Commercial Loss Doc-
trine is not a rule that limits tort actions; it is merely a restatement of
what was a pre-existing area of law, i.e., contract law, in which tort law
originally had no place.3 ' We have reached such a convoluted concep-
tualization of the Commercial Loss Doctrine that practitioners will
ask whether the Commercial Loss Doctrine should apply to a certain
area of law to limit tort claims, or whether an "exception" to the Com-
mercial Loss Doctrine should be created for certain industries. The
assumption is that tort claims have always been allowed unless courts
have explicitly said that the Commercial Loss Doctrine limits them.
However, the opposite is true: courts have allowed tort claims in ar-
eas governed by contracts in a very narrow and limited manner, and
for specific policy reasons, like to protect a person from bodily dam-
age or damage to other property caused by another party who is in a
better position to prevent or insure against the injury.32
Nonetheless, practitioners now tend to think that tort claims are the
norm and can be brought whenever the Commercial Loss Doctrine
does not bar them. This effectively switches the burden of proof to
the defendant instead of the plaintiff. If traditional contract law has
governed a certain industry historically, then proponents of bringing
tort claims should have the burden of articulating specific policy rea-
sons justifying tort claims, just as the courts found public policy rea-
30. Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Touche Ross & Co., 636 N.E.2d 503,
520-25 (Heiple, J., dissenting). Part of the problem is that practitioners advocate "exceptions" to
the Commercial Loss Doctrine, when they would not be exceptions at all. That is, if there is an
extra-contractual tort duty, the Commercial Loss Doctrine would not apply in the first place.
Therefore, there should not be "exceptions" to the Commercial Loss Doctrine; it either applies
or it does not.
31. The way we speak about the Commercial Loss Doctrine is not unlike what happened to
the United States Bill of Rights. That is, the Federalists, lead by Alexander Hamilton, argued
that there was no purpose for having a Bill of Rights because the federal government was limited
and could only act as provided for by the Constitution. Because the Constitution does not ex-
pressly provide the federal government with the right to violate any of the rights enumerated in
the Bill of Rights, the government simply has no power to do so, whether the Bill of Rights exists
protecting those rights or not. In fact, Hamilton believed that by expressly limiting certain pow-
ers of the federal government, a Bill of Rights could be interpreted to grant all others. THE
FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). Is this not what has happened over time, i.e., people
have conceptualized the federal government as being able do anything so long as not limited by
the Bill of Rights? That being said, the Commercial Loss Doctrine is essentially the Bill of
Rights of Tort Law, which was created for very narrow and express reasons like the federal
government. There was no reason to assume that any doctrine was needed to protect the areas
of law where tort had no authority to tread, but because we created the Commercial Loss Doc-
trine, the same fears Hamilton expressed about the Bill of Rights are material in tort law.
32. Richard C. Ausness, An Insurance-Based Compensation System for Product-Related Inju-
ries, 58 U. Pm. L. REV. 669, 671 (1997).
[Vol. 8:339
THE COMMERCIAL Loss DOCTRINE
sons to allow tort claims for defective products in the past.33
Defendants should not have to justify why the Commercial Loss Doc-
trine should apply to bar tort claims.
D. Courts Should Refrain from Labeling Damages as Economic in
Nature and Start by Asking Whether Commercial Policy or Tort
Policy Governs the Relationship Between the Parties
The first part of this article will attempt to unfurl the Commercial
Loss Doctrine as it exists in Illinois regarding product liability law,
service contracts, and professional service contracts. It is easier to
conceptualize the proper application of the Commercial Loss Doc-
trine by determining whether the claim is one for a loss governed by
commercial policy considerations, or for a loss that is governed by tort
policy theories. Therefore, Illinois courts should stop beginning their
analyses by asking whether the type of damage is "economic damage."
As Judge Posner pointed out, this only confuses the matter because so
many tort damages are purely economic in nature, e.g., lost wages,
damages for tortious interference with a contract or business, profes-
sional malpractice, etc.34 A true "Economic Loss Doctrine" would
have to bar all of these claims. Instead, the court should ask, "are the
damages commercial?" If so, the Commercial Loss Doctrine should
apply to bar tort claims.
The difference between economic and commercial damages de-
pends upon the legal theory under which the damages arise, not the
type of damages incurred. For instance, as explained above, a tort is
allowed when a defective product injures a person (or other property)
because Illinois courts have determined that manufacturers owe an
extra-contractual duty of care not to harm purchasers of their prod-
ucts. 35 This extra-contractual duty arises because the manufacturer is
in the best position to prevent the defect and to insure that those in-
jured by the defect are made whole. 36 When this type of extra-con-
tractual policy governs the claim, the losses, whether personal or
purely economic, should be recoverable in tort. However, when there
are no extra-contractual relationships or duties between the parties,
the relationship should be governed by the commercial contract.
When conceptualized in this manner it is easy to determine whether
33. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (N.Y. 1916); Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y.
397 (N.Y. 1852).
34. Miller v. United States Steel Corp., 902 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1990).
35. See, e.g., Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 86 (Ill. 1965).
36. Id.
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tort claims should be allowed or barred by the Commercial Loss
Doctrine.
E. The Commercial Loss Doctrine in Construction Cases
The second part of this article argues that the Commercial Loss
Doctrine should be applied very broadly in cases involving construc-
tion defects, because the same policy rationales for allowing tort
claims in product liability cases simply do not apply to construction
defect claims (in most cases).37 I make a narrow exception for al-
lowing tort claims against architects and engineers because there are
rational policy justifications for the existence of extra-contractual du-
ties between architects and engineers, their clients, and third parties.
It is hard to completely separate the product liability cases from the
construction cases because they have evolved together. Therefore,
when I discuss the "sudden and calamitous" requirement or the "dam-
age to other property" requirement in the first part of this article it
will be necessary to discuss both types of cases together.
II. APPLICATION OF THE "TRADITIONAL MOORMAN RULE" TO
TANGIBLE PRODUCTS
A. Minority, Majority, and Intermediate Rules
In 1965, two different courts, one in New Jersey and one in Califor-
nia, addressed the problem of the Commercial Loss Doctrine in prod-
uct liability cases and came to opposite conclusions regarding its
application. In Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, a New Jersey court
heard a case in which a purchaser of carpeting sued the manufacturer
in tort for a defect in the carpeting and the court held that the tort
claim could proceed because the Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C.") did not provide the exclusive remedy for commercial
transactions.38 The Santor court reasoned that the doctrine of strict
liability exists so that the costs of injuries, to either the product itself
or other property or persons, is borne by the manufacturer. 39 This
became known as the minority rule, and its clear implications were
that all contractual defenses a manufacturer might have were swal-
lowed by the very broad liability doctrine of strict tort liability.40 In a
California case, Seely v. White Motor Co., a consumer purchased a
37. 1 will discuss some construction cases in the first part of the paper given their pertinent
place in the history of the development of the Commercial Loss Doctrine.
38. 207 A.2d 305, 311-12 (N.J. 1965).
39. Id. at 311-12 (citing Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963)).
40. New Jersey no longer holds this minority view. See, e.g., Alloway v. Gen. Marine Indus.,
L.P., 695 A.2d 264, 275 (N.J. 1997).
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truck which had a defect causing the truck to overturn, resulting in
property damage to the truck, but not to the driver or to other prop-
erty.41 The Seely court did not allow a tort action for economic dam-
age, reasoning that the consumer should bear the risk that the product
will not conform to his economic expectations. 42 This became the ma-
jority rule.
In Illinois, the seminal case was decided in 1982, when the Illinois
Supreme Court ruled in Moorman Manufacturing. Co. v. National
Tank Co.43 In Moorman, the plaintiff purchased a grain storage tank,
which later exploded due to a crack that developed on one of its steel
plates.44 The plaintiff brought suit alleging design and manufacturing
defects in the tank.4 5 Even though the tank exploded suddenly, there
were no injuries to any person or to any property other than the tank
itself, and the only damages the plaintiff sought were for the tank's
damage and loss of the use of the tank.46 The Court held that the
allegations of the complaint sounded in contract rather than tort and
the plaintiff's damages were merely those of disappointed consumer
economic expectations, properly left to warranty remedies. 47 The
Court defined economic losses as "damages for inadequate value,
costs of repair and replacement of the defective product, or.conse-
quent loss of profits - without any claim of personal injury or dam-
age to other property." 48 The Moorman court reasoned that the strict
liability theory adopted by the court in Suvada49 and Section 402A of
the Restatement50 limited strict liability theory to "unreasonably dan-
gerous defects" resulting in physical harm to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property.5' The "unreasonably dangerous" language
of strict liability law indicates that there must be some aspect of the
product that can cause a person or his property harm in a dangerous
manner, which comports with the public policy of product liability law,
because the manufacturer is in the best position to prevent such dam-
41. 403 P.2d 145, 147 (Cal. 1965).
42. Id. at 151-52.
43. 435 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. 1982).
44. Id. at 445.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 444-45.
47. Id. at 450.
48. Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 449 (quoting Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurispru-
dence, 66 COLuM. L. REV. 917, 918 (1966)).
49. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 188 (lll. 1965).
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
51. Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 447.
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ages. 52 Furthermore, the Moorman court pointed out that Comment
d. to Section 402B of the Restatement of Torts implies that the rule of
strict product liability was not meant to eclipse the U.C.C. or the com-
mon law of sales, which traditionally provided the only recovery of
economic losses:
The liability stated in this section is liability in tort, and not in con-
tract; and if it is to be called one of 'warranty,' it is at least a differ-
ent kind of warranty from that involved in the ordinary sale of
goods from the immediate seller to the immediate buyer.53
Thus, the Moorman court would only allow a tort claim where there
is damage to other property or persons from a defective product.
However, the Moorman court also adopted the requirement that the
damage result from a "sudden and dangerous" event.54 This has be-
come one version of the "intermediate rule,"55 which is similar to the
majority rule, except that it allows for tort recoveries under certain
limited circumstances, i.e., only where the event causing injury is sud-
den and calamitous. 56 The "sudden and calamitous" requirement in-
sures that victims of accidents are compensated in tort only when the
policy rationale of tort liability is met, i.e., there must be an unreason-
ably dangerous condition of the product.
The Moorman court analyzed the instances in which tort claims
should be allowed in product liability cases quite well. It is apparent
that the court analyzed the policy reasons for allowing tort claims ver-
sus contract claims rather than merely looking to whether the dam-
52. Id. at 448. The Moorman court felt that product liability tort law should also apply to
claims in which "other property" is damaged by an unreasonable dangerous condition because
"[p]hysical injury to property is so akin to personal injury that there is no reason to distinguish
them." Id. (quoting Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 152 (Cal. 1965)).
53. Id. at 452 (quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d
280, 288 (3d Cir. 1980) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B cmt. d (1965)).
54. Id. at 450.
55. There is a second version of the intermediate rule that has been adopted by some courts.
That is, in the Moorman case, there must be damage to other property or persons and the dam-
age must have occurred via a sudden and calamitous event. It is a conjunctive relationship, both
requirements must be met. In a Tennessee case, Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., the plaintiff argued that
recovery should be permitted if there is damage to other property/persons or if there is a sudden
and calamitous event. This is a disjunctive relationship, i.e., either there could be damage to
other persons or property and tort claims would be allowed, or there could be damage to the
product itself via a sudden and calamitous event and a tort claim would be allowed. This version
of the intermediate rule is discussed in Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 293 S.W.3d
487 (Tenn. 2009); Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324
(Alaska 1981).
56. The requirement that the damage result from a sudden and dangerous event has often
been called the "sudden and calamitous" requirement. These terms are used interchangeably.
Throughout this article, the term "sudden and calamitous" refers to the Moorman "sudden and
dangerous" requirement.
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ages were economic in nature. However, by using the term "economic
loss," the Moorman court inadvertently set in motion the standard by
which courts tend to look at whether damage sustained is economic or
not, instead of looking to whether there are tort policies to justify the
claim or whether the claim is governed by contractual and commercial
policies.
B. Sudden and Calamitous Event
Under the traditional Moorman doctrine,57 even if a plaintiff can
prove that there was a defect in the product and that a person or other
property was in fact damaged, a plaintiff is also required to prove the
injury resulted from a sudden and calamitous event before he can re-
cover in tort.58 This is known as the "sudden and calamitous" event
prong of the test and prevents plaintiffs from recovering in tort if the
damage to the person or other property results from the gradual dete-
rioration of the product over time. (However, it is arguable whether
Section 402B of the Restatement of Torts (Second) 59 and the Suvada60
court's use of the language "unreasonably dangerous" for strict liabil-
ity claims necessarily indicates that an unreasonably dangerous condi-
tion must be temporally limited, as the phrase "sudden and calamitous
event" does.) Nonetheless, the Moorman court adopted the reasoning
put forth in a 1966 Columbia Law Review article which stated the
following: "[w]hen the defect causes an accident 'involving some vio-
lence or collision with external objects,' the resulting loss is treated as
property damage. On the other hand, when the damage to the product
results from deterioration, internal breakage, or other non-accidental
causes, it is treated as economic loss."61 By citing this language, it is
clear the Moorman court required a "sudden and calamitous event" in
order for a plaintiff to recover in tort in Illinois.
57. I will refer to the traditional Moorman doctrine as the traditional product liability analysis
enunciated in the Moorman case involving damage to other property via a sudden and calami-
tous event.
58. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 450 (Ill. 1982). But see Bd. of Educ.
of Chi. v. A, C & S, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580, 590 (Ill. 1989). There was a brief period in Illinois in
which the Illinois Supreme Court implied that the sudden and calamitous requirement was no
longer needed to sustain a tort claim.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965).
60. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (Ill. 1965).
61. Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 449 (quoting Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurispru-
dence, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 917, 918 (1966)).
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1. Cases in Which the Event is Considered
Sudden and Calamitous
In the past thirty years there have been numerous decisions in Illi-
nois analyzing what constitutes a sudden and calamitous event. Jus-
tice Simon, in his special concurrence in the Moorman decision,
defined a sudden event as one that arises from "[h]azards peripheral
to the product's [intended] function."62 This definition is a bit vague
with respect to what is "peripheral" to a product's intended function
and really has nothing to do with the suddenness of the event. In the
Fourth Appellate District, the Mars case involved the construction of
a warehouse in which steel beams were blown over by a large thun-
derstorm.63 The Mars court held that a sudden occurrence is one that
is "highly dangerous and presents the likelihood of personal injury or
injury to other property."6 Once again, nothing in this definition sug-
gests suddenness or temporality. However, the consensus has been
that the focus should be on the suddenness of the occurrence of the
event that causes the injury, not the suddenness of the underlying
cause leading to the event that finally caused the injury.65 For in-
stance, in American Xyrofin, a centrifugal compressor failed causing
severe damage to itself and surrounding premises. 66 The court held
that in characterizing an event as sudden and calamitous the focus
should be upon:
the suddenness of the occurrence of an event - the point when the
injury occurs . . . where such occurrence causes personal injury or
damage to property external to the defective product which exposes
a party to an unreasonable risk of injury to himself or his property,
rather than the suddenness or length of time within which the defect
or cause of the occurrence develops . . . and manifests itself in the
sudden and calamitous occurrence.67
This definition clears up scenarios in which the product gradually de-
teriorates over time, such as slow leakage which then results in a sud-
den event, like a roof collapse.
Since clearing up the definition of a sudden event, Illinois courts
have found a sudden event in a number of different situations. In
62. Id. at 455-456 (Simon, J., concurring specially).
63. Mars, Inc. v. Heritage Builders of Effingham, 763 N.E.2d 428, 432 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)
64. Id. at 435 (quoting Stepan Co. v. Winter Panel Corp., 948 F. Supp. 802, 807-08 (N.D. Ill.
1996)).
65. Am. Xyrofin, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 595 N.E.2d 650, 657 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992);
United Airlines, Inc. v. CEI Industries of Ill., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 558, 562 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
66. Am. Xyrofin, 595 N.E.2d at 653.
67. Id. at 657 (quoting United Airlines, Inc. v. CEI Indus. of Ill., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 558, 562 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986)) (emphasis omitted).
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Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., the Illinois Supreme
Court held that a fire in a warehouse was a "sudden and dangerous
conflagration." 6 8 In United Airlines, Inc. v. CEI Industries, the sudden
and total collapse of a roof due to leaking water and defects was sud-
den.6 9 In Bi-Petro Ref. Co. v. Hartness Painting, Inc., the plaintiff,
much like the plaintiff in Moorman, alleged damages resulting from a
defect in a storage tank.70 The Fourth Appellate District, however,
distinguished the occurrence from that in Moorman because the tank
"suddenly and violently ruptured" while being filled with water,
whereas the complaint in Moorman had alleged the occurrence as tak-
ing place over the course of months.71 Finally, in Vaughn v. General
Motors Corp., the court held that the roll-over of a vehicle, caused by
defective brakes, was a sudden and calamitous event.72 As one can
see, the temporal aspect of a sudden and calamitous event remains the
primary way to measure the event, and "suddenness" is measured at
the time of injury.
In one noteworthy case, Bagel v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.,
an Illinois Appellate Court seems not to have considered the sudden-
ness of the event that caused the injury, but instead looked to the
suddenness of the build-up to the event. 73 In Bagel, a defect in a mo-
torcycle engine caused the engine to "suddenly" stop, but the court
held that it did not qualify as a sudden and calamitous event because
the event did not occur in a dangerous manner that posed an unrea-
sonable risk of injury to the plaintiff or his property.74 The Bagel
court could have made a ruling based upon the fact that there was no
damage to other property, but the court went on to hold that the "loss
resulted from a qualitative defect in the motorcycle like the crack in
the grain storage tank in Moorman . .. [which] developed over a pe-
68. 493 N.E.2d 1022, 1026 (Ill. 1986).
69. 499 N.E.2d 558, 563 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
70. Bi-Petro Ref. Co. v. Hartness Painting, Inc., 458 N.E.2d 209, 210 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
71. Id. at 212; Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co, 435 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. 1982).
72. 466 N.E.2d 195, 197 (Ill. 1984); see, e.g., Exxonmobil Oil Corp. v. Amex Constr. Co., 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41495, at *8 (N.D. Ill 2008) (decoupling of a pipe stopped water circulation to
the refinery's cooling system, necessitating an emergency shutdown of various units within the
refinery); Mercury Skyline Yacht Charters v. Dave Matthews Band, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
29663, at *16-17 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (dumping of human waste on a tour boat was a sudden and
dangerous event); Mars, Inc. v. Heritage Builders of Effingham, 763 N.E.2d 428, 436 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2002) (thunderstorming weather was a sudden and dangerous event); Am. Xyrofin, 595
N.E.2d at 654 (failure of compressor unit was a sudden and dangerous event); Elec. Group, Inc.
v. Cent. Roofing Co., Inc., 518 N.E.2d 369, 371 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (leaking water in a roof was a
sudden and dangerous event).
73. Bagel v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 477 N.E.2d 54, 58 (lll. App. Ct. 1985).
74. Id.
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riod of time."75 Thus, even though the final event was sudden, the
Bagel court held that the defect was the deterioration of the engine.76
2. Cases in Which the Damage is Due to Gradual Deterioration
If a loss is due to "deterioration, internal breakdown, or non-acci-
dental cause[s]," the sudden and calamitous event prong of the Moor-
man test will not have been met, and the plaintiff will not be able to
sustain a tort claim.77 Such deterioration has been found mostly in
latent building defects, such as damage from the gradual deterioration
of siding that split open and fell off over a period of years,78 gradual
leaking from underground storage tanks, 79 or the gradual deteriora-
tion of construction of poor quality.80
3. Mold and Contamination: A Sudden and Calamitous Event?
A difficult factual scenario for the courts has been property damage
caused by mold. In Muirfield Village-Vernon Hills, L.L.C. v. K.
Reinke, Jr. & Co., the court addressed whether the development of
mold in a house purchased by the plaintiffs could be considered a
"sudden and calamitous" event.81 Unlike the gradual accumulation of
water on a roof which eventually results in a roof collapsing, the
growth of mold in Muirfield was not actually sudden.82 Nonetheless,
the Muirfield court held that "while the growth of the mold and bacte-
ria occurred gradually, it is still a sudden and calamitous event for
purposes of analyzing the application of the economic loss rule."83
The court reasoned as follows:
[The mold growth] was sudden and calamitous, damaging the [plain-
tiffs'] personal property and requiring them to flee their house or
experience the likelihood of personal injury. Properly viewed from
the point of injury, and not from the development of the mold and
bacterial infestation, the occurrence was sufficiently sudden and ca-
lamitous to place it under the exception to the economic loss rule




77. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co, 435 N.E.2d 443, 450 (Ill. 1982).
78. Foxcroft Townhome Owners Ass'n v. Hoffman Rosner Corp., 435 N.E.2d 210, 216 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1982); Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324, 326-27 (Ill. 1982).
79. NBD Bank v. Krueger Ringier, Inc., 686 N.E.2d 704, 708 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
80. Anderson Elec., Inc. v. Ledbetter Erection Corp., 479 N.E.2d 476, 479 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
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The Muirfield court focused on the fact that the mold's effect on the
homeowners manifested itself suddenly, which seems to be a question-
able premise.85 The Muirfield decision did not comport with an ear-
lier First Appellate District decision, NBD Bank v. Krueger Ringier,
Inc.,86 which involved a tort to recover costs incurred investigating,
cleaning, removing, and restoring petroleum-contaminated soil on a
parcel of land purchased from defendant. 7 Unlike the mold in
Muirfield, the NBD Bank court held that "the damage alleged by
plaintiffs was certainly caused by gradual deterioration, internal
breakage, or other non-accidental causes, rather than a sudden or
dangerous event."88 Muirfield and NBD Bank are only inconsistent
when analyzed via the traditional Moorman doctrine; instead, the
courts should have asked whether there were any extra-contractual
duties that allowed for tort claims.
Consider a pre-Moorman case in this milieu, Van Brocklin v.
Gudema, in which manure from the defendant's barn contaminated
the plaintiffs' well.89 The issue considered by the court was "whether
the law permits recovery for inconvenience and discomfort entailed in
the temporary loss of a water supply caused by the negligence of an-
other."90 This was, in essence, an early economic loss claim. The
court held that the plaintiffs "were entitled to recover for their incon-
venience and discomfort during the period that their well was contam-
inated" because there was an extra-contractual tort duty not to
contaminate the well. 91
Compare these rulings to Mayer v. Chicago Mechanical Services,
Inc., a case in which the plaintiffs sued their condominium complex's
heating and air conditioning system installer after the system broke
down, causing mold and requiring the plaintiff to obtain temporary,
alternative housing.92 The court held that it was not clear whether the
Moorman doctrine applied to these facts but denied recovery because
the plaintiff was seeking vague, intangible damages.93
85. Id.
86. 686 N.E.2d at 708.
87. Id. at 706.
88. Id. at 708.
89. 199 N.E.2d 457, 458-59 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964).
90. Id. at 461.
91. Id. at 462.
92. 925 N.E.2d 317, 318 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
93. Id. at 323. The court analyzed the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929(1) (1979),
which provides that "[i]f one is entitled to a judgment for harm to land resulting from a past
invasion and not amounting to a total destruction of value, the damages include compensation
for .. . the difference between the value of the land before the harm and the value after the harm
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Instead of contorting the Moorman doctrine in order to fit mold
and contamination cases into the realm of "sudden and calamitous"
events, courts would do better to ask whether there are extra-contrac-
tual duties that govern the relationship between the parties. 94 Fur-
thermore, in cases involving residences, most plaintiffs can maintain a
warranty of habitability claim without privity. 95 Therefore, extra-con-
tractual duties that allow a plaintiff to bring tort claims exist where
there is no sudden and calamitous event and thus the claim is purely
economic.
4. Death of the Sudden and Calamitous Requirement
One 1989 Illinois Supreme Court case appeared to eradicate the
sudden and calamitous event requirement. In Board of Education v.
A, C & S, Inc., an asbestos case, the court held that it is not critical to
a strict products liability action that a sudden and calamitous event
occurred. 96 The court held:
[A]sbestos damages do not easily fit within the framework delineat-
ing tort and contract, and it is evidenced in this prong of Moor-
man.97 However, we believe that the critical inquiry in this instance
is whether the product has an unreasonably dangerous defect and
whether the defect caused the property damage alleged. To prevent
recovery in tort merely because the physical harm did not occur
suddenly would defeat the underlying purposes of strict products
liability.98
However, in 1997, the Illinois Supreme Court stated in Trans States
Airlines v. Pratt & Whitney Canada that it "[does] not read the prof-
fered language in A, C & S as a wholesale rejection of the 'sudden and
calamitous' requirement for other property cases. Clear from the lan-
guage is that the court was attempting to confine its reasoning to the
particular facts of the case." 99
.... ." However, § 929(1) pertains to damages recoverable and not to whether a tort has been
committed.
94. It is clear the court flirted with the concept of nuisance as an extra-contractual duty in Van
Brocklin, 199 N.E.2d at 461.
95. See, e.g., Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324, 330 (Ill. 1982).
96. 546 N.E.2d 580, 590 (Ill. 1989) (citing E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.,
476 U.S. 858, 870 (1986)).
97. This is the problem of squeezing everything into the traditional Moorman doctrine instead
of asking whether there are extra-contractual duties that should allow for the tort claim to
proceed.
98. 546 N.E.2d at 590 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. c. (1965), which
notes that the purpose of products liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from
defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather
than by the injured persons).
99. Trans States Airlines v. Pratt & Whitney Can., 682 N.E.2d 45, 55 (Ill. 1997).
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A, C & S was clearly an anomalous decision, and even though the
A, C & S court flirted with the idea that there is no real policy reason
as to why a sudden and calamitous event is necessary,100 no Illinois
court since has truly analyzed why such an event is required for a tort
claim. Many cases have hinted that the reason for requiring a sudden
and calamitous event is that a sudden event makes a product unrea-
sonably dangerous and poses a risk of injury to persons and prop-
erty.101 But does that not also apply to processes that take time to
develop and never result in a sudden and calamitous event such as
asbestos or mold growth? Cannot gradual defects be unreasonably
dangerous and pose a threat to the health and welfare of persons and
property? I believe a sudden and calamitous event is necessary be-
cause the plaintiff has some duty to discover an event that is gradual.
For instance, in A, C & S, the court reasoned that this factor is evi-
dence of assumption of risk and comparative fault.102
5. Repair and Notice
Illinois courts have also noted that a history of repairs prior to the
occurrence does not necessarily detract from the characterization of
the event as "sudden and calamitous" when there is evidence proving
that the product failed in a sudden and calamitous manner. In Vaughn
v. General Motors Corp., the plaintiff continued to use a truck despite
knowledge of its faulty condition, eventually leading to a crash that
damaged the truck. 03 The Illinois Supreme Court held that the plain-
tiff's knowledge of the defect was relevant to issues such as assump-
tion of the risk and comparative fault rather than whether the
Commercial Loss Doctrine precluded recovery. 104
This holding seems to be contrary to the policy analysis regarding
the Commercial Loss Doctrine, and I believe if a plaintiff has notice of
a defect that eventually results in a sudden and calamitous event, the
policy reasons for allowing a tort claim do not apply. That is, it makes
sense to allow tort claims in cases where manufacturers are in a better
position to prevent unreasonably dangerous defects; however, when a
consumer is repairing a product or has notice of the defect, he or she
is then in a better position to prevent the unreasonably dangerous de-
100. 546 N.E.2d at 590.
101. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co, 435 N.E.2d 443, 451 (111. 1982).
102. Id.
103. 466 N.E.2d 195, 195 (Ill. 1984).
104. Id. at 197. Cf United Air Lines, Inc. v. CEI Indus. of Ill., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 558, 562 (111.
App. Ct. 1986) (holding that a roof collapse was sudden and calamitous even though plaintiff
was aware of water accumulation resulting from roof leaks).
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fect from becoming a sudden and calamitous event. 05 As the Vaughn
court stated, such notice may best be analyzed as part of a plaintiff's
assumption of the risk or contributory negligence,106 but I believe,
given the rationale for allowing tort claims, it should bar the claim in
the commercial context.
6. Actual Damage, Not Just Risk of Injury
The Moorman court also settled the question of whether a risk of
injury to persons or other property from an unreasonably dangerous
and sudden event is enough to plead a claim in tort.107 That is, per-
haps a grain storage tank which suddenly explodes, but does not in-
jure a person or other property, would suffice to plead a tort claim.
This is exactly what the plaintiff in Moorman tried to argue, that the
defect posed an "extreme threat to life and limb, and to property of
plaintiff and others" which only fortunately did not materialize. 08
The theory is that if the Commercial Loss Doctrine only allows tort
claims where there is actual damage then it "permits identically situ-
ated plaintiffs in the same case to be treated differently for recovery
of their damages based solely on the fortuity that one may have suf-
fered property damage along with economic damage."1 09 However, as
in any tort case, actual damages are a requirement for a valid claim.
Therefore, a product that poses a high degree of unreasonable risk of
harm but in fact does not cause any harm will not be actionable as a
tort claim pursuant to the Commercial Loss Doctrine.1'0
C. Other Property Requirement
In addition to the requirement that there be a sudden and calami-
tous event, the Moorman doctrine requires that the defective product
105. In fact, what is to prevent a plaintiff from constantly and unreasonably making repairs to
a product due to its deterioration until the product fails in a sudden and calamitous manner, at
which point the plaintiff could recover for not only nominal damages to other property but also
for the direct and indirect economic losses to the product itself?
106. 466 N.E.2d at 197.
107. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co, 435 N.E.2d 443, 450 (Ill. 1982).
108. Id. at 449.
109. In re Chi. Flood Litig., 680 N.E.2d 265, 275 (Ill. 1997); Vill. of Deerfield v. Common-
wealth Edison Co., 929 N.E.2d 1, 13 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
110. See Bd. of Educ. v. A, C & S, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580, 587 (Ill. 1989) (reaffirming the posi-
tion that an allegation of risk alone is not a proper extension of the Commercial Loss Doctrine.
There must also be actual physical harm caused by the product); see also In re Ill. Bell Switching
Station Litig., 641 N.E.2d 440, 444 (Ill. 1994) (analyzing why the "other property" requirement is
not a fortuity). This was not true in all jurisdictions, for instance a federal court held that the
allegation of unreasonable risk of harm alone is sufficient to plead a claim in tort. Penn. Glass
Sand Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1167 (3d Cir. 1981).
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must damage other persons or property."' The Illinois Supreme
Court noted that the sudden and calamitous event, by itself, does not
constitute an exception to the Commercial Loss Doctrine. Rather, the
exception is composed of a sudden, dangerous, or calamitous event
coupled with personal injury or damage to other property. 112
In 1984, the Illinois Supreme Court eliminated the requirement that
there must be damage to "other property" in order for a plaintiff to
recover in tort."i3 Thereafter, a plaintiff could recover for damage to
the original property if the event was sudden and calamitous.114 How-
ever, in 1997, the Trans States court stated, "the evolution of the eco-
nomic loss doctrine in Illinois and in other jurisdictions requires our
reconsideration of the holding in Vaughn and particularly what consti-
tutes Moorman property damage."" 5 In overruling Vaughn, Trans
States held that "where the product damages itself only, the harm that
product liability law is designed to protect against is not realized." 16
Since Cardozo's McPherson decision, courts have allowed tort
claims in products liability cases premised on the theory that consum-
ers should not be limited by privity requirements to recover for per-
sonal injury or damage to other property that stemmed from an
unreasonably dangerous condition of a product." 7 However, pursu-
ant to the Vaughn decision, the little niche of tort law that acted as an
exception to the remedies under the U.C.C. was beginning to "im-
prison the contract area with inapposite tort concepts."s18 Because
Vaughn was overturned, damage to other property is now a necessary
condition of pleading a claim for damages in tort law.11 9 However,
since the Trans States decision in 1997, there has been much analysis
of what constitutes "other property," which is discussed below.
111. 435 N.E.2d at 450.
112. Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d at 327 (1982).
113. Vaughn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 466 N.E.2d 195, 197 (Ill. 1984).
114. Id. at 196 (noting that if a defect in a product "creates a dangerous condition and causes
damages of a sudden and calamitous nature, the loss, even if it is limited to the product itself, is
considered property damage and the injured party has a tort action").
115. Trans States Airlines v. Pratt & Whitney Can., 682 N.E.2d 45, 50 (Ill. 1997). The Trans
States court pointed out that the 1989 case, Bd. of Educ. of Chi. v. A, C & S, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580
(Ill. 1989), expressly rejected Penn. Glass, which provided the basis for the Vaughn court's theory
allowing recovery in tort for damage to the product itself. Id. at 50-51.
116. Id. at 53.
117. See Beth Rogers, Legal Reform - At The Expense Of Federalism?: House Bill 956, Com-
mon Sense Civil Justice Reform Act and Senate Bill 565, Product Liability Reform Act, 21 DAY-
TON L. REV. 513 (1996).
118. Trans States, 682 N.E.2d at 54 (quoting Note, Manufacturers' Liability To Remote Pur-
chasers For "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 539, 549 (1966)).
119. Id. at 53.
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1. No Commercial vs. Consumers Distinction in Illinois
Some jurisdictions make a distinction between commercial transac-
tions and consumer transactions in deciding whether "other property"
must be damaged in order to sustain a tort claim. These jurisdictions
allow tort recovery in consumer transactions when there is damage
solely to the product itself; however, in transactions between two com-
mercial vendors, the courts refuse to allow negligence or strict tort
recovery for damage to the product itself and require "other property
damage" to sustain the tort claim.120 The theory for such a distinction
is that retail consumers are not on an equal footing with the manufac-
turer or seller to bargain effectively for the allocation of risk, a con-
cern inapplicable when commercial parties of equal bargaining power
enter into a contract.121 Nonetheless, the Trans States court was not
persuaded that the consumer/commercial transaction distinction
makes any difference and thus, under Illinois law, both retail consum-
ers and commercial consumers will have to plead and prove damage
to other property in order to sustain a tort claim.122
2. Component Parts
The two most litigated areas regarding what constitutes "other
property" are component parts in buildings and component parts in
product liability cases. In order to determine whether a component
part is considered part of the assembled whole or separate property,
four different tests have arisen: (1) the product bargained for test;12 3
(2) the product sold test;124 (3) the forseeablility test;12 5 and (4) the
"separate-treatment" test.126 While Illinois has adopted the product
bargained for test, recent decisions may foreshadow a move towards
the forseeability test.127
a. The "Product Bargained For" Test
In the Trans States case, the Illinois Supreme Court succinctly sum-
marized the issues regarding whether damage caused by component
parts to separate parts of the same product should be considered dam-
120. Id. (citing W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 101 n.14 .5 (5th ed. Supp. 1988));
see, e.g., Sherman v. Johnson & Towers Bait., Inc., 760 F. Supp. 499 (D. Md. 1990).
121. Trans States, 682 N.E.2d at 54.
122. Id. at 54.
123. Id. at 57.
124. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 877 (1997).
125. Dakota Gasification Co. v. Pascoe Building Sys., 91 F.3d 1094, 1096-97 (8th Cir. 1996).
126. Trans States, 682 N.E.2d at 58.
127. Westfield Ins. Co. v. Birkey's Farm Store, Inc., 924 N.E.2d 1231, 1235 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
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age to "other property."1 28 1In Trans States, the defendant, Pratt &
Whitney Canada ("Pratt"), manufactured airplane gas turbine engines
and sold the engines to Aerospatiale, a large French aircraft manufac-
turer, under a written sales contract that included express warran-
ties.129 Aerospatiale incorporated the engines into one of its airplanes
and then sold that plane to McDonnell Douglas.130 McDonnell Doug-
las leased the plane to a company called GPA ATR, Inc., which in
turn subleased the plane to the plaintiff, Trans States Airlines.131 An
engine fire started mid-flight, and, after the plane successfully landed,
it was determined that some of the inter-turbine duct bolts had loos-
ened and fractured, hitting the engine's power turbine blades.132 The
engine caught fire and destroyed other parts of the aircraft.'33 Be-
cause of the many players in the supply chain of the engine, it was not
clear that any express warranties would pass through to the plaintiff,
and thus the plaintiff pled a case in tort for the damage to the aircraft
caused by Pratt's defective engine.134
In order to overcome the Commercial Loss Doctrine, the plaintiff
had to allege that there was damage to property other than the engine
itself. The plaintiff argued that a "separate-treatment" test should be
used in order to determine whether the engine was separate from the
fuselage of the airplane, which was also damaged in the fire.'3 5 The
plaintiffs separate-treatment theory maintained that: (1) the engine
was certificated at Pratt separate and apart from the airframe certifi-
cation; (2) the engine came with its own maintenance, parts, and ser-
vice publication manuals prepared by Pratt; (3) each engine had its
own maintenance logbook which was kept independently of the air-
frame maintenance logbook; (4) the engine came with its own war-
ranty issued by Pratt, which was separate and distinct from the
airframe warranty; and (5) each engine had its own title documenta-
tion separate and apart from the airframe.136 In opposition, the de-
fendant argued that the plaintiff "bargained for" and received a fully
integrated aircraft, complete with the engine as a component part
from the seller/lessor GPA ATR.137 The Trans States court held that
128. Trans States, 682 N.E.2d at 45.
129. Id. at 46.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 47. The engine was warranted separate and apart from the Aerospatiale airframe
warranty.
133. Trans States, 682 N.E.2d at 46.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 55.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 56.
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the "separate-treatment" test was unsupported by any authority and is
problematic because most products are comprised of components,
many of which are removable and interchangeable.13 8 Furthermore,
the court reasoned that it was necessary to look to the sublease agree-
ment between the plaintiff and the immediate lessor of the aircraft in
order to determine what the "product bargained for" was.139 In the
sublease, "the Aircraft" was defined as a "fully integrated aircraft." 140
Therefore, the Trans States court adopted the "product bargained for"
test in order to determine whether other property was damaged.141
b. The "Product Sold" Test
Some jurisdictions will look to the "product sold" in order to deter-
mine what the product is for purposes of determining whether other
property has been damaged. In most transactions, the product sold by
the manufacturer and the product purchased by the plaintiff is one in
the same. However, there are some cases in which subsequent buyers
have purchased a product in which other parts have been added, such
as the airplane in Trans States. That is, in Trans States, the product
bargained for by the plaintiff was the fully integrated aircraft, whereas
the products sold by Pratt, the defendant manufacturer, were only the
engines;142 thus, under the "product-sold" test, the damage to the fu-
selage would be considered "other property."
The product sold test was adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., where a pri-
mary purchaser of a ship added a skiff, a fishing net, and spare parts,
then sold the ship to a secondary purchaser.143 An engine room fire
led to the sinking of the ship, and a faulty hydraulic system was deter-
mined to be the cause of the sinking.144 The United States Supreme
Court held that the vessel itself, as placed in the stream of commerce
by the manufacturer, was the "product," thus drawing a distinction
between components added to a product by a manufacturer before
the product's sale to a user and those added after by an intermediary
in the supply chain.145 Therefore, even though the plaintiff "bar-
gained for" and purchased the product with all the additional parts
already added by persons in the supply chain, the Court determined
138. Trans States, 682 N.E.2d at 58.
139. Id. at 57.
140. Id. at 58.
141. Id. at 58-59.
142. Id. at 46-47.
143. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 877 (1997).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 884-85.
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that the vessel the manufacturer sold was the "product" and the other
additions constituted "other property" that was damaged, thus al-
lowing the tort claim to proceed. 146 Illinois does not follow this rule.
c. Foreseeable Damage
Some states are expanding the Commercial Loss Doctrine to bar
tort recovery to other property if it was foreseeable by the plaintiff at
the time of purchase that the product might damage the surrounding
property. For instance, in Dakota Gasification Co. v. Pascoe Building
Systems, the plaintiff purchased an oxygen plant from the govern-
ment.147 The plaintiff also purchased steel from a separate party
which was used to build the roof, and thereafter the roof of the plant
collapsed due to a faulty weld.14 8 The steel that failed was supplied
separately by a sub-contractor and the damage was not merely to the
supplied steel, but also to the oxygen plant building and its equip-
ment.149 Under a Moorman analysis, the product purchased by the
plaintiff was steel, and thus there was clearly damage to other prop-
erty - the plant and equipment - via a sudden and calamitous
event.150 Nonetheless, the Dakota court held that because the damage
to the oxygen plant from the defective steel was a harm that was "rea-
sonably foreseeable" to the parties at the time of contracting, "con-
tract law, and not tort law, must provide the remedy for this purely
economic loss."'s' The Dakota court reasoned that because the dam-
aged property was within the contemplation of the parties to the con-
tract, "the parties contractually determined their respective exposure
to risk, regardless whether the damage was to the 'goods' themselves
or to 'other property.'" 152
Illinois does not follow this rule. However, in 2010, the Third Dis-
trict of Illinois decided Westfield Ins. Co. v. Birkey's Farm Store, Inc.,
146. Id. at 879.
147. Dakota Gasification Co. v. Pascoe Building Sys., 91 F.3d 1094, 1096-97 (8th Cir. 1996).
148. Id. at 1097.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1096-97. The plaintiff bought the building from the U.S. government "as is" and
without any warranties.
151. Id. at 1101.
152. 91 F.3d at 1099. This is a very interesting holding because it brings the policy position
behind the Commercial Loss Doctrine full circle. That is, purely economic damages can be allo-
cated among the buyer and seller of a product via negotiations for warranty and price reduction
and therefore we prefer contract claims to govern the loss. The Dakota court indicated that the
parties could also negotiate which party should bear the risk of damage to other property from a
defective, even unreasonably dangerous, product. As I discussed in the beginning of this article
there is no real reason why such contractual warranties should not govern personal injury claims.
(Other than the fact that consumers may refrain from purchasing them.)
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in which the defendant sold the plaintiff a tractor with an automatic
steering unit that subsequently caught on fire and was damaged. 53
The court held that the Commercial Loss Doctrine applied because
the automatic steering unit was an integrated tractor part; therefore,
there was no damage to other property.154 However, the Westfield
decision went further and held that the Commercial Loss Doctrine
also bars tort recovery for "any type of damage that one would rea-
sonably expect as a direct consequence of, or incidental to, the failure
of the defective product."155 Therefore, the plaintiff's allegation of
damage to the fire extinguisher, equipment, employee clothing, and
claims for loss of employee time and even physical injury did not con-
stitute "other property" for the purpose of sustaining a claim in
tort.15 6 Whether the Illinois Supreme Court will adopt the "reasona-
bly foreseeable" test has yet to be seen.
D. Summary of Product Liability Law
As can be seen, the Moorman court's analysis focused on the in-
stances in which tort claims should be barred in product liability cases,
and the court's policy analysis comported with that of product liability
law.' 57 The Moorman court clearly enunciated the extra-contractual
duties that arise when a product is unreasonably dangerous and causes
damage to other property via a sudden and calamitous event.158 The
problem is that the traditional Moorman test for product liability
cases was misconstrued as being a test to determine when damage is
purely economic in all scenarios, and thus Illinois courts began the
long tradition of asking whether damages were economic in nature in
order to determine whether tort claims should be allowed, instead of
asking whether there were extra-contractual tort duties between the
parties. This misguided interpretation of the Moorman holding has
lead to much confusion in its application to other areas of law, and
therefore Illinois courts should stop asking whether damages are eco-
nomic and start asking whether there are extra-contractual duties be-
tween the parties.
153. 924 N.E.2d 1231, 1235 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
154. Id. at 1244.
155. Id. at 1243-44 (citing Trans States, 682 N.E.2d at 51).
156. Id. at 1244 (citing Trans States, 682 N.E.2d at 58-59).
157. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. 1982).
158. Id.
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E. Attempts to Turn Warranty Law into Tort Law
Before leaving the discussion of product liability law, I would like to
address one author's suggestion that privity requirements for warranty
claims should be eradicated in order to combat the limitation imposed
by the Commercial Loss Doctrine, because such a theory is irrational.
In his article, Privity, Products Liability, and UCC Warranties: A Ret-
rospect of and Prospects for Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318, Steven
Bonanno has suggested technical ways around the prohibitions sur-
rounding the bringing of tort claims for purely economic loss.159 One
method is to admit that the loss is commercial in nature and thus gov-
erned by contract law and warranties; however, a plaintiff would then
argue that all privity requirements should be eliminated under the
U.C.C., essentially turning contract law into tort law.160
Mr. Bonanno argues that potential revisions to 810 Ill. Comp. Stat.
5/2-318 should allow for warranties to extend beyond the purchaser to
all ultimate users of products, thus eliminating all privity require-
ments.161 810 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-318 was adopted by Illinois and ex-
tended warranties, express and implied, to members of the purchaser's
household and guests in the home, even though these parties were
never in privity of contract with the seller.162 Thereafter, Illinois
courts have taken it upon themselves to further extend the erosion of
privity requirements to third parties such as employees. For instance,
in Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., the court felt that warranties
should extend to employees when employee safety was part of the
benefit of the bargain negotiated by the employer with the seller.163
This decision essentially expanded horizontal privity - persons not in
the supply chain but instead in the purchaser's house or place of em-
ployment, but not vertical privity - those parties downstream in the
supply chain.164 However, not long thereafter, Illinois courts also
eradicated vertical privity requirements in cases of personal injury, al-
lowing a person who was physically injured to bring warranty claims
even though he was not in privity of contract with the buyer.165
Mr. Bonanno argues that § 2-318 should be expanded to eliminate
all vertical privity requirements and allow warranties to cover persons
159. Steven Bonanno, Privity, Products Liability, and UCC Warranties: A Retrospect of and
Prospects for Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 177 (1991).
160. Id. at 198. It would of course not exactly be a tort claim because it would still be subject
to warranty limitations and contractual defenses.
161. Id. at 205.
162. 810 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-318 (2010).
163. 509 N.E.2d 591, 595 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
164. The Illinois statute does not apply to economic loss.
165. Berry v. G. D. Searle & Co., 309 N.E.2d 550, 558 (Ill. 1974).
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who have suffered only economic loss.166 Bonanno's argument is that
because Moorman prevents tort claims in these situations, Illinois
should expand contract claims to cover these parties.167 For instance,
he argues that "a plaintiff who has suffered only economic losses
should not be subject to a more rigorous privity requirement than one
who has suffered personal injury."168 The author's solution is to ex-
tend all warranties to the "ultimate user," in essence creating a strict
liability regime under contract law for economic damages, merely to
provide a remedy to those who cannot recover under tort law.169
However, this is not an argument or a theory. It is a preference, a
posit, a dictate, and a personal opinion of justice which ignores the
policy rationales for allowing tort or contract claims. Bonanno does
not even mention the policy rationales for allowing tort claims when
personal injuries occur or where there is an extra-contractual duty,
compared to the policy rationales for recovery for mere deterioration
of a product in contract law. Illinois courts have not, and should not,
consider expanding the scope of 810 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-318.
Bonanno ignores the fact that contract law is supposed to protect the
mutual intent of the contracting parties, and eliminating the privity
requirement for economic loss merely turns the contract claim into a
tort claim without any rational policy basis for doing so.
III. THE "OTHER" MOORMAN DOCTRINES: INTENTIONAL AND
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONS
The Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co. case prima-
rily discussed the Commercial Loss Doctrine in the context of product
liability law as applied to a manufacturer of goods; however, the
Moorman court also held that a plaintiff should be allowed to bring
tort claims for purely economic damage where the plaintiff's damages
are proximately caused by a defendant's intentional, false representa-
tion, i.e., fraud; or where the plaintiff's damages are proximately
caused by a negligent misrepresentation by a defendant "in the busi-
ness of supplying information for the guidance of others in their busi-
ness transactions."o7 0 These exceptions make sense if the Commercial
Loss Doctrine begins with an analysis of the policy reasons for al-
lowing tort claims based on the extra-contractual duties between par-
166. Bonanno, supra note 119, at 205.
167. Id. at 197-98.
168. Id. at 198-99.
169. Id. at 204. Bonanno also believes that § 2-318 should be amended to change the words
"injured in person" to merely "injured" which would encompass all economic damages. Id.
170. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 452 (Ill. 1982).
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ties. However, they do not make sense if one starts by categorizing
the damages as economic versus non-economic. That is, when bring-
ing a tort claim pursuant to misrepresentation theories, a plaintiff con-
cedes that the damages are economic in nature and instead argues that
an extra-contractual tort duty exists, which arises via a potential de-
fendant's non-contractual relationships to third parties. Allowing for
misrepresentation claims for purely economic damages should only be
allowed in cases in which there are policy reasons that take the loss
out of the realm of commercial loss and clearly place it in the realm of
tort.
For instance, in Rozny v. Marnul, the plaintiff homeowners brought
a suit against a defendant surveyor for an inaccurate survey prepared
for a builder, which resulted in building encroachments on neighbor-
ing land.171 The plaintiffs were not in contractual privity with the sur-
veyor and therefore the plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to
tort recovery.172 The plaintiff argued that there are numerous theo-
ries of recovery available to a party not in privity of contract with the
defendant, including: (1) strict liability in tort; (2) implied warranty
free of the privity requirement; (3) third-party beneficiary doctrine;
(4) express warranty free of the privity requirement; and (5) tortious
misrepresentation.17 3 The Rozny court proceeded under the fifth the-
ory, indicating that the defendant's knowledge that the survey would
be used and relied on by persons other than the builder (including
plaintiffs, whose ultimate use was foreseeable) gave rise to claim for
tortious misrepresentation if the plaintiff justifiably relied on these
representations.174
The Rozny court allowed for negligent misrepresentation tort
claims thirteen years before the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the
Commercial Loss Doctrine. However, this is not to say that misrepre-
sentation claims should be allowed as an exception to the Commercial
Loss Doctrine simply for the sake of stare decisis. Instead, there are
rational, extra-contractual tort policies for these claims. For instance,
when a defendant can reasonably foresee that a third party not in
privity with the defendant may rely on the information provided, the
defendant has a duty to make representations in a non-negligent man-
ner.'7 5 Originally developed out of warranty law, the history of mis-
171. 250 N.E.2d 656, 657 (Ill. 1969).
172. Id. at 659.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 660 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966)).
175. See generally William L. Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 VAND. L. REV.
231 (1966) (discussing the history of misrepresentation claims).
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representation claims parallels the development of strict tort liability
claims from implied warranties, and it is clearly an extra-contractual
tort remedy based upon public policy and not the mutual intent of the
parties.176
As for intentional misrepresentation claims, in Soules v. General
Motors Corp., the plaintiff invested in a franchise based upon an auto
manufacturer's oral representations that the franchise met its mini-
mum financial requirements; however, it was shown that the auto
manufacturer knew that the franchise did not meet its original or con-
tinuing financial requirements and that its periodic financial reports
were false. 177 The investor brought a tort suit alleging fraudulent mis-
representation. 178 "[T]he elements of a cause of action for fraudulent
misrepresentation . . . are: (1) false statement of material fact, (2)
known or believed to be false by the party making it, (3) intent to
induce the other party to act; (4) action by the other party in reliance
on the truth of the statement; and (5) damage to the other party re-
sulting from such reliance."179 The appellate court conceded that the
manufacturer made misrepresentations about the financial statements,
but held that the plaintiff was a director of the corporation and there-
fore was not justified in relying on the defendant's representations
that the franchisee met the capital requirements.180 The Illinois Su-
preme Court agreed that whether the plaintiff's reliance on informa-
tion was reasonable is based upon the facts of which the "plaintiff had
actual knowledge as well as those of which he 'might have availed
himself by the exercise of ordinary prudence."'181 However, in this
case, the examination of allegedly false reports would "not have re-
vealed that the franchisee failed to meet its continuing financial re-
quirements."18 2 Therefore, the plaintiff reasonably relied upon the
misrepresentations, and the tort claim for the economic loss could
proceed.183 This analysis is suffuse with tort language and concepts.
It is clear that the claim for fraudulent misrepresentation is also based
176. The provenance of implied warranty claims indicates that they are derived by courts
pursuant to public policy needs. There is nothing contractual about them under classical con-
tract theory, which is based upon mutual intent of the parties. Sean M. Flower, Is Strict Product
Liability in Tort Identical to Implied Warranty in Contract in the Context of Personal Injuries?, 62
Mo. L. REV. 381 (1997); MARSHALL S. SHApo, THE LAW OF PRODucrs LIABILYTY ch. 6 (3d ed.
1994) (discussing the history of implied warranty).
177. 402 N.E.2d 599, 600 (Ill. 1980).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 601 (citing Steinberg v. Chi. Med. Sch., 371 N.E.2d 634 (Ill. 1977)).
180. Id. at 601.
181. Id. (quoting Schmidt v. Landfield, 169 N.E.2d 229, 232 (Ill. 1960)).
182. Soules, 402 N.E.2d at 601.
183. Id.
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upon extra-contractual tort policies as was the claim in Rozny; how-
ever, if one begins the analysis by asking whether the damages are
economic under the traditional Moorman product liability test, the
tort claim would be barred as the damages are clearly economic.
Finally, in Tolan & Son, Inc. v. KLLM Architects, Inc., the court
extended negligent misrepresentation claims to defendants not ordi-
narily in the business of supplying information.1 8 4 Before Tolan, a de-
fendant that was not in the business of supplying information could
only be held liable for intentional misrepresentation; however, the To-
lan Court felt that the Restatement (Second) Section 552 phrase "any
other transaction in which [the defendant] has an interest" means that
a defendant need not necessarily be in the business of supplying infor-
mation, but must merely have an interest in the transaction. 8s
The Tolan court expanded the reach of misrepresentation claims
further than the Moorman court. Under Tolan, as long as the infor-
mation is "important" to the nature of the business, the negligent mis-
representation claim will be allowed, but if it is "ancillary" then it is
still barred.186 This may be a distinction without a difference. None-
theless, Tolan is a First Appellate District case and does not overrule
Moorman, which was an Illinois Supreme Court case.187 Furthermore,
the Tolan court did not extend negligent misrepresentation claims to
manufacturers of goods, which means that a plaintiff bringing a suit
against a manufacturer of goods must still allege intentional misrepre-
sentations when there is only economic loss.18 8 Neither Soules, Rozny
nor Tolan implied that economic loss was recoverable for innocent
misrepresentation.
On their face, the Soules, Rozny and Tolan cases seem to be excep-
tions to the traditional Moorman doctrine in that they provide the
framework for expanding tort recovery for economic loss to parties
that are not in privity of contract and expanding tort claims to numer-
ous service industries.189 However, this is a misreading of the cases
184. Tolan & Son, Inc. v. KLLM Architects, Inc., 719 N.E.2d 288 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
185. Id. at 298. Some Illinois courts have extended negligent representation theory to defend-
ants that are under a "public duty" to provide accurate information, even if they are not techni-
cally "in the business of supplying information." See Lehmann v. Arnold, 484 N.E.2d 473 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985); see also Stewart v. Thrasher, 610 N.E.2d 799 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
186. Tolan, 719 N.E.2d at 296.
187. The Seventh Circuit, in Rankow v. First Chicago Corp., 870 F.2d 356, 364 (7th Cir. 1989),
divided information providers into three categories: defendants that supply information in con-
junction with tangible products, those that provide only information, and those in between.
188. See Tolan, 719 N.E.2d at 297.
189. Since Moorman, Illinois's courts have allowed recovery of economic losses in tort for
intentional interference with contract and intentional interference with prospective business ad-
vantage. See also Werblood v. Columbia Coll. of Chi., 536 N.E.2d 750 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); San-
2010]1 369
370 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
and a misunderstanding of the genealogy of the Moorman doctrine.
First, the Soules and Rozny cases preceded the Moorman case, and
they did not reference the same principles and concerns that the
Moorman case analyzed in deciding whether a tort claim can be al-
lowed for the economic loss to a "good." The Soules and Rozny cases
simply discuss an extra-contractual duty to not make tortious misrep-
resentations. It is one of the five tort recovery theories discussed by
the Rozny court and has nothing to do with the traditional Moorman
doctrine that is applied in product liability cases. A traditional prod-
uct liability case analyzed under the Moorman doctrine begins by ask-
ing whether there is damage to other property via a sudden and
calamitous event, which determines whether the damages are eco-
nomic in nature, which in turn determines whether recovery is allowed
in tort.190 However, in misrepresentation cases, the plaintiff concedes
that the damage is purely economic, a concession that would mean a
per se denial of recovery in applying the traditional Moorman doc-
trine to the sale of goods. In fact, it would be quite illogical to analyze
misrepresentation cases under the traditional Moorman doctrine, 191
because there is obviously no sudden and calamitous event, and no
unreasonable risk of injury to persons or other property. Therefore,
even though the Moorman court lists negligent and intentional mis-
representations as the second and third means to recover for eco-
nomic damages, when one analyzes misrepresentation theories under
Moorman, as one would analyze "goods" under Moorman, it simply
muddies the waters.192
The Moorman court concisely defined a rational tort theory for al-
lowing recovery for purely "economic damages" for defective goods
under product liability law, but the Moorman court did not expand on
the policy justifications for allowing misrepresentation claims, and
therefore misrepresentation claims seem to be an exception carved
out of the traditional Moorman doctrine simply because they pre-ex-
isted the Moorman decision.193 Instead, misrepresentation claims
should be analyzed as extra-contractual duties that society has
tucci Constr. Co. v. Baxter & Woodman, Inc., 151 Ill. App. 3d 547, 502 N.E.2d 1134 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986). The principle common to those decisions is that the defendant owes a duty in tort to
prevent precisely the type of economic harm that occurred.
190. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. 1982). What the traditional
Moorman analysis is really determining is whether the claim is commercial or tortious in theory.
191. To reiterate, I am using the phrase traditional Moorman doctrine to denote the tradi-
tional claim in product liability cases in which unreasonably dangerous products cause damages
to other persons or property via a sudden and calamitous event.
192. Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 452.
193. Id. at 452.
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deemed should be recoverable in tort because they are founded upon
rational tort policies, i.e., persons who provide information when they
know others will rely on it have created a special relationship between
themselves and the other person out of which a duty not to be negli-
gent in providing that information arises.194 Therefore, if one begins
by asking whether the damages are economic in nature or not, the
three exceptions in the Moorman decision are not consistent: eco-
nomic damages to goods are not recoverable, but economic damages
caused by misrepresentations are. However, when one begins a
Moorman analysis by asking whether extra-contractual tort duties
control the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, all
three exceptions listed in the Moorman decision are consistent. If
there are extra-contractual duties that justify the claim, then the Com-
mercial Loss Doctrine does not apply and it makes no difference if the
damages are economic or not.
Conceptualizing the application of the Moorman doctrine in this
manner will allow future Illinois courts to apply the doctrine to other
areas of law governed by contracts, especially services and profes-
sional services, in which the application of the traditional Moorman
doctrine for "goods" only serves to confuse the issues. As will be
seen, the Commercial Loss Doctrine was originally applied to product
liability cases and misrepresentation cases, but has since been ex-
tended to the service industries 95 and to the professional service in-
dustries.196 Much of the confusion in its application stems from trying
to analyze such cases as traditional Moorman cases and beginning
with the question, "are the damages economic?"
IV. THE COMMERCIAL Loss DOcTRINE EXPANDED TO
SERVICE CONTRACTS1 97
The application of the Commercial Loss Doctrine to the service in-
dustry has been somewhat controversial and completely nebulous.
This is largely due to the fact that many lawyers and judges have con-
flated different aspects of the traditional Moorman doctrine and tort
claims for misrepresentation with regard to service providers. For in-
194. Society has deemed tortious misrepresentation claims to be justified pursuant to fiduci-
ary, or regular, duties that exist between the parties, whether a contract makes provisions for
them or not. Andrew C.J. McCandless Kidd, The Perimeters of Liability for Negligent Misrepre-
sentation in Maryland, 48 MD. L. REV. 384, 387 (1989).
195. Anderson Elec., Inc. v. Ledbetter Erection Corp., 503 N.E.2d 246 (Ill. 1986).
196. 2314 Lincoln Park W. Condo. Ass'n v. Mann, Gin, Ebel & Frazier, Ltd., 555 N.E.2d 346
(Ill. 1990).
197. For more analysis see Timothy L. Bertschy, Negligent Performance of Service Contracts
and the Economic Loss Doctrine, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 249 (1984).
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stance, in Anderson, Ledbetter hired Anderson to work on a machine,
and Ledbetter also hired Walther to inspect Anderson's work and in-
form Ledbetter of any deviations from the specifications so that cor-
rections could be made.198 Anderson had no contractual relationship
with Walther, but sued Walther pursuant to the theory that Walther
undertook a duty to supervise and inspect Anderson's work and that
Walther negligently performed that duty by requiring much of the
work to be redone unnecessarily.199 This caused Anderson to incur
unnecessary additional costs. 20 0
If Anderson is analyzed as a traditional Moorman claim, there can
be no recovery, because Anderson made no claim for personal injury
or property damage (nor was there an allegation of a sudden and ca-
lamitous event, only dissatisfaction with the quality of inspections
made by Walther).201 Therefore, the court correctly held that there
was no economic loss and that the claim should be barred by the tradi-
tional Moorman doctrine. 202 However, the court pointed out that An-
derson did not claim Walther was a supplier of information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions and that it made neg-
ligent or intentional representations. 203 Such a claim would perhaps
be redressable in tort, but the court did not reach that issue.204
The Anderson case is important in that it underscores the need to
understand and properly plead a tort claim against a service provider.
Why would Anderson plead a product liability tort claim and try to
prove that the traditional Moorman doctrine does not apply?. It is
obvious that there was no sudden event or damage to other property,
and therefore, there is obviously no issue as to whether the damages
were completely economic in nature. And once the damages are de-
termined to be economic, the traditional Moorman doctrine bars them
per se. Anderson could have brought a variety of other tort claims
(with a much higher prospect of prevailing), and conceded that the
damages were economic in nature but premised the claims on the the-
ory that there are extra-contractual duties that allow tort claims for
economic damages, e.g., implied warranty free of the privity require-
ment; third-party beneficiary doctrine; tortious misrepresentation; tor-
tious interference with contract; and/or tortious interference with
prospective business advantage.




202. Id. at 249.
203. Anderson, 503 N.E.2d at 249-50.
204. Id.
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A. Legal Malpractice
In addition to regular service providers, the Commercial Loss Doc-
trine has been analyzed and found to apply to many professional ser-
vice providers such as architects and engineers. 205 However, in 2314
Lincoln Park W. Condominium Ass'n v. Mann, Gin, Ebel & Frazier,
Ltd., a case in which the Illinois Supreme Court did not allow the
plaintiff to sue in tort for malpractice against an architect and engi-
neer, the court, in dicta, noted that the holding should not be inter-
preted to stand for the end of all recovery for malpractice in tort.206
By their very nature, these types of damages are economic. 207 The
Lincoln Park court noted that, historically, legal malpractice claims
had been allowed in tort because Illinois courts had found that attor-
neys owe extra-contractual fiduciary duties to their clients, which arise
not from contract, but from the traditional responsibilities that a law-
yer owes to a client and to third-parties.208 Fiduciary duties encom-
pass much more than the extra-contractual duties involved in
negligent and intentional misrepresentation claims, and fiduciary du-
ties arose long before the Commercial Loss Doctrine.
For instance, in Collins v. Reynard, the Illinois Supreme Court held
that a complaint against a lawyer for professional malpractice may be
couched in either contract or tort.209 The appellate court had rea-
soned that Moorman should be extended to bar a legal malpractice
claim, even though the Lincoln Park court expressly stated that it did
not intend to determine the future application of Moorman in all ar-
eas of professional malpractice. 210 The case was appealed to the Illi-
nois Supreme Court, which reversed the appellate court's decision.211
The Illinois Supreme Court explicitly stated:
[o]ur ruling is grounded on historical precedent rather than logic. If
something has been handled in a certain way for a long period of
time and if people are familiar with the practice and accustomed to
205. See 2314 Lincoln Park W. Condo. Ass'n v. Mann, Gin, Ebel & Frazier, Ltd., 555 N.E.2d
346, 350 (Ill. 1990).
206. Id. at 353.
207. Unless the negligent design results in injury or damage to other property.
208. Id. at 353.
209. 607 N.E.2d 1185, 1187 (Ill. 1992); see also McLane v. Russell, 546 N.E.2d 1185 (Ill. 1989)
(beneficiaries of will were allowed to bring a malpractice action against attorney); Ogle v.
Fuiten, 466 N.E.2d 224 (Ill. 1984) (plaintiffs allowed to bring a malpractice action against attor-
ney even though they were not beneficiaries of the will in question); Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440
N.E.2d 96 (Ill. 1982) (plaintiffs allowed to bring a malpractice action against attorney under
contractual breach or negligence).
210. Collins, 607 N.E.2d at 1186.
211. Id. at 1187.
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its use, it is reasonable to continue with that practice until and un-
less good cause is shown to change the rule. 2 12
However, the court should not have based this decision on stare deci-
sis: there was a rational policy basis for the holding. In his special
concurrence, Justice Miller pointed out that in all other service cases
in which Illinois's courts held that the Commercial Loss Doctrine
barred the tort claim, the courts explicitly noted, "the commercial or
contractual nature of the parties' relationship," 213 and that "the com-
plaining party, if he wished protection against the particular type of
harm suffered, could have bargained for a guarantee or warranty
against it."214
Justice Miller pointed out why legal malpractice claims are different:
[i]t is difficult to apply [the Commercial Loss Doctrine] in the area
of legal representation, where the purpose of retaining counsel is to
obtain a representative who will function as a fiduciary and will act
professionally, with reasonable skill and ability, to advance the cli-
ent's interests. It would be rare indeed for an attorney to guarantee
or to promise to achieve a particular result in a matter.215
That is well said. Justice Miller tried to bring the Collins decision back
into the realm of logical reasoning so that the court did not have to
merely rely on stare decisis to allow legal malpractice tort claims. A
contract for legal services is clearly a commercial contract, as are
other service contracts in which the court has held that the economic
loss should bar recovery. 216 However, the most logical reason for al-
lowing tort claims in legal malpractice cases is similar to the extra-
contractual duties that make for a misrepresentation claim. That is, an
attorney cannot warrant results, only that he will exercise a certain
standard of competence. This is a reasonable standard of care, which
is a tort concept. Furthermore, if a client could only recover on his
contract with his attorney, who does he consult to make sure the con-
tract sufficiently allows recovery for breached fiduciary duties? An-
other attorney, and so on ad infinitum? There are logical reasons for
allowing legal malpractice tort claims, and these reasons bring the at-
torney-client relationship out of the realm of a commercial contract
and into a realm of law that deals with standards of care and tort
claims.
212. Id. at 1186.
213. Id. at 1188 (Miller, C.J., concurring).
214. Id. at 1189.
215. Collins, 607 N.E.2d at 1189 (Miller, C.J., concurring) (citing RONALD E. MALLEN & JEF-
FREY M. SmiTH, 1 LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8.4, at 415 (3d ed. 1989)).
216. Anderson Elec., Inc. v. Ledbetter Erection Corp., 503 N.E.2d 246 (111. 1986); 2314 Lin-
coln Park W. Condo. Ass'n v. Mann, Gin, Ebel & Frazier, Ltd., 555 N.E.2d 346, 353 (Ill. 1990).
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B. Accountants
In Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Touche Ross
& Co., the Illinois Supreme Court stated the following:
the evolution of the [Commercial] Loss Doctrine shows that the
doctrine is applicable to the service industry only where the duty of
the party performing the service is defined by the contract that he
executes with his client. Where a duty arises outside of the contract,
the [Commercial Loss ] doctrine does not prohibit recovery in tort
for the negligent breach of that duty.2 1 7
The question before the court was whether the duty an accountant
owes his client is defined by his contractual obligations, or is extra-
contractual. The court held that the duty is extra-contractual, stating:
[a] client should know that an accountant must make certain deci-
sions independently, and the client had the right to rely on the ac-
countant's knowledge and expertise when those decisions are made
by the accountant. This knowledge and expertise cannot be memo-
rialized in contract terms, but is expected independent of the ac-
countant's contractual obligations. 218
In essence, the Congregation court reaffirmed the idea that if duties
arise outside of a contract, a tort claim is possible; however, the court
had to answer this vexing question, "how do we know if there are
duties that arise outside of the context of a contract?" In making a
distinction between architects, in which the Commercial Loss Doc-
trine bars tort claims, and lawyers and accountants, in which tort
claims are allowed, the Congregation court reasoned as follows:
[w]hether the professional produces a legal brief or a financial state-
ment, the value of the services rendered lies in the ideas behind the
documents, not in the documents themselves. In contrast to the re-
lationship between an attorney or accountant and their client, the
relationship between an architect and his client produces something
tangible, such as a plan that results in a structure. The characteris-
tics of a tangible object are readily ascertainable, and they can be
memorialized in a contract and studied by the parties. 219
This seems to be a very metaphysical distinction that can only serve to
complicate the issues, and as discussed in Part II, I believe that archi-
tects and engineers should be held liable in tort because there are ex-
tra-contractual duties they owe to clients that are similar to those an
accountant or lawyer owes to their clients.220
217. Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Touche Ross & Co., 636 N.E.2d 503,
514 (Ill. 1994).
218. Id. at 515.
219. Id.
220. See supra Part II.
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The Congregation court seems to be saying that if the final product
produced is abstract ideas then there is a duty to use reasonable care,
but if the final product is tangible then there are not extra-contractual
duties to use reasonable care because tangible items can be captured
in a contract. Therefore, the duties a lawyer or accountant owes to a
client cannot be reduced to contractual terms, while the duties an ar-
chitect or engineer owes to his or her clients can be reduced to con-
tractual terms.221 This is of course not true: just because the plans and
specifications of an architect or engineer can be reduced to tangible
terms does not mean the duties owed between the parties can be re-
duced to tangible terms.
Furthermore, the Congregation court's distinction between archi-
tects and lawyers seems to be a bit tenuous and only serves to muddy
the waters of Moorman analysis, as Judge Heiple points out in her
dissent:
[o]nce again, this court has plunged into the quagmire known as the
Moorman doctrine and dredged up yet another ill-conceived excep-
tion to add to the current confusion. . . . [T]he majority opinion
puts litigants and trial judges in a position of having to guess what
the exception of the month is. Yesterday it was attorneys. Today, it
is accountants but not architects. Tomorrow, who can say? 222
This dissent concisely underscores the confusion that arises by concep-
tualizing "exceptions" to the Moorman doctrine that are created
seemingly piecemeal, instead of conceptualizing the doctrine as a
Commercial Loss Doctrine in which tort claims should be allowed
only if a duty to use reasonable care exists because of the special rela-
tion between an accountant or attorney and a client.
C. Veterinarians
In Loman v. Freeman, the plaintiff alleged property damage to his
horse resulting from the negligent practice of veterinary medicine. 223
Instead of asking whether extra-contractual duties existed that would
allow a tort claim, the court applied the traditional product liability
Moorman analysis. 224 The damage was a laceration with a scalpel,
which the appellate court had held was relatively "sudden and danger-
ous," compared with a process of deterioration such as the develop-
221. This seems a bit odd. So when a deal is made to construct a building that has defects the
architect can only be sued in contract because the final result of his work-product is a tangible
building, whereas a lawyer that closes the same deal can be sued in tort if the lawyer makes a
mistake during the transaction?
222. Congregation, 636 N.E.2d at 520-25.
223. Loman v. Freeman, 890 N.E.2d 446, 450 (Ill. 2008).
224. Id. at 453.
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ment of a crack in a grain-storage tank in Moorman.225 The Illinois
Supreme Court pointed out that "the application of the 'sudden and
dangerous' exception to the Moorman doctrine to the conduct of one
who has contracted to provide a service, as opposed to the failure of a
product, is awkward at best." 226 The Court further stated that "the
owner of an animal could seek a remedy in tort if he alleged malprac-
tice in the performance of veterinary surgery, but he would be limited
by Moorman to a contractual remedy if he alleged that the veterina-
rian misdiagnosed a disease or failed to render the proper non-surgi-
cal treatment." 227 Instead of using the traditional Moorman product
liability test, the Loman court should have considered whether there
might be extra-contractual duties that a veterinarian owes a client sim-
ilar to a doctor, lawyer or an accountant.
V. THE COMMERCIAL Loss DOCTRINE APPLIED TO THE
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 22 8
The application of the Commercial Loss Doctrine to the construc-
tion of buildings is very similar to that of product liability law in which
there are many component parts that are added to the product at dif-
ferent times in the process. However, in applying the Moorman doc-
trine to construction cases, there seem to be many awkward
contortions of the doctrine in order to fit construction claims into
traditional product liability claims. I believe the policy reasons that
the Moorman court articulated for allowing tort claims in product lia-
bility cases simply do not apply to the construction industry, and thus
the Commercial Loss Doctrine should usually be applied to bar tort
claims, unless those claims are based upon negligent or intentional
misrepresentation, or are plead against an architect or engineer. This
is due to the fact that the policy rationale for product liability claims,
i.e., putting the risk of loss on the manufacturer, who is in the best
position to prevent the defect and to insure against the same, simply
does not apply to the construction industry, even when the construc-
tion involves a single family home purchased by unsophisticated buy-
ers. This is because construction contracts are not consummated in
the same way or with the frequency that product sales are in a mass
market global economy. That is, every time a building is constructed,
all parties, including the owners, developers, architects, engineers,
225. Id. at 452.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. For more analysis see Mark C. Friedlander, The Impact of Moorman and Its Progeny on
Construction Litigation, 77 ILL. B.J. 654 (1989).
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purchasers and subcontractors, are all sophisticated parties that are
experienced in the industry and retain counsel, or should retain coun-
sel, to review contracts for risk of loss and risk shifting. There is every
opportunity, by every party involved, to allocate the risk of all events,
even sudden and calamitous events that result in injuries to persons or
other property. The only exception to this should be for tort claims
against architects and engineers, who, I believe, have duties that can-
not be reduced to a contract and thus are extra-contractual. However,
Illinois courts have not analyzed construction cases in this manner.
Instead, the Moorman doctrine has been applied piecemeal, resulting
in a variety of inconsistent rules.
A. Buildings, Service Contractors, and Other Property
Shortly after the Moorman decision in 1982, the Illinois Supreme
Court had the opportunity to apply the Moorman doctrine to a case
involving a defective home. 2 2 9 In Redarowicz, the chimney and the
adjoining wall of the plaintiff's house pulled away from the rest of the
house.230 The plaintiff sued the original builder of the house in tort
because the plaintiff was not in privity with the builder, and the court
held that the Commercial Loss Doctrine barred the plaintiff's claim
for damages for the cost of repairing the house itself because there
was no damage to "other property."231 However, the court noted that
"the adjoining wall [did] not collapse[ ] on and destroy[ ] the plaintiff's
living room furniture," thus suggesting that the Commercial Loss
Doctrine would not bar a tort claim for damage to personal property
within the house if that damage had materialized.232 After
Redarowicz, it became clear that under Illinois law, damage to inven-
tory, furniture, and other goods that are stored in a building would be
considered damage to "other property" barring the application of the
Commercial Loss Doctrine, presumably because that property is "bar-
gained for" separately than the building itself.23 3
229. Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982).
230. Id. at 325.
231. Id. at 327.
232. Id.
233. Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 493 N.E.2d 1022 (1986). There, a fire
broke out in Montgomery Ward and caused extensive damage to the property of the tenants of
the remaining portions of the building. The court held that the losses were not purely economic:
"They are seeking damages for the loss of property other than the defective product. The com-
plaints pray for damages resulting from the loss of audio equipment, paint sprayers, speakers,
inventory, supplies, and stock." Id. at 1026. See also Chicago Flood, 680 N.E.2d 265, 281 (Ill.
1997) (goods stored in a tunnel that was flooded due to damage done to a bridge during its
repair were considered other property).
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The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has also ad-
dressed the issue of what constitutes other property in the context of
construction cases. In one case, the plaintiff's home was flooded when
a sprinkler system malfunctioned. 234 The court found that the flood-
ing was sufficiently sudden and dangerous, but only allowed recovery
for plaintiff's personal belongings - not for any damage done to the
rest of his home - because the sprinkler system was a component part
of the house.235 The court's explanation went no further than stating
that the sprinkler was a component part of the house. There was no
explanation of whether the sprinkler system was installed before or
after the sale to the plaintiff or whether the court was using the "prod-
uct bargained for" test outlined in Trans States.236
However, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ad-
dressed the same scenario one year later and used the "product bar-
gained for" test and "forseeability" test, directly citing the Trans States
decision.237 In City of Peru, the plaintiff, the City of Peru ("the City"),
owned the Starved Rock hydroelectric plant, and a fire started from
an inadvertent brake application during testing of one of the plant's
generators.238 The City sued two contractors and two subcontractors,
and the subcontractors brought motions to dismiss the tort claims
based upon the Commercial Loss Doctrine. 239 The contractors were
hired to provide design, consulting, and engineering services, while
one subcontractor provided electrical generators, and the other pro-
vided services in connection with the installation and operation of
software systems. 240 The City's theory was that since the subcontrac-
tors only worked on certain component parts of the plant, all other
property in the plant constituted "other property" for which plaintiff
could recover in tort.241 However, the court held that the "city did not
bargain separately for electrical generators or software. It bargained
for a plant. It was foreseeable that defective component parts could
result in damage to the whole plant, and the City could have bar-
234. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. James McHugh Constr. Co., No. 99 C 256, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16475, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
235. Id. at *10-11; see also Foxcroft Townhome Owners Ass'n v. Hoffman Rosner Corp., 449
N.E.2d 125, 128 (Ill. 1983) (holding that Moorman barred a negligence action for deterioration
due to faulty construction and for the costs of repairing and replacing allegedly defective siding).
236. Trans States Airlines v. Pratt & Whitney Can., 682 N.E.2d 45, 57 (Ill. 1997).
237. City of Peru v. Bouvier Hydropower, Inc., No. 00 C 1179, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19393,
at *6 (N.D. 111. 2000).
238. Id. at *2.
239. Id. at *5-6.
240. Id. at *6-7.
241. Id. at *7.
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gained in consideration of such risks."242 It is clear that the court used
the "product bargained for" test and the "foreseeable damage" test
that was used in product liability law.
The leap from product liability law to Redarowicz, Metro., and City
of Peru is conceptually coherent because the defendants were sellers
of a tangible item, a building. However, as stated above, the same
policy reasons for allowing a tort claim in the realm of product liability
simply do not apply in construction cases. For instance, when some-
one purchases a home, he has every opportunity to retain professional
lawyers, real estate brokers, inspectors, and so forth. He also has
every opportunity to fully consider every provision of the purchase
contract and allocate risk in a manner of their choosing. This is a ma-
jor purchase, not the purchase of a mass-produced consumer product,
and therefore the same policy rationale for allowing tort claims in
product liability cases simply does not apply to construction and real
estate cases.
To complicate matters even further in the realm of construction law,
once a plaintiff sues a pure service provider for negligent installation
of a product that results in damage to that product, the entanglement
with the Moorman doctrine serves no purpose but to confuse all par-
ties involved. For instance, in one Illinois Appellate case, a property
owner hired a contractor, who hired a subcontractor, to erect a steel-
frame system that would eventually support a building.243 The steel
frame collapsed, and the plaintiff brought suit against the subcontrac-
tor for negligence in failing to properly brace the frame. 244 The plain-
tiff sought damages for the loss of value of the frame itself and lost
profits due to the delay in construction. 245 The defendant sought dis-
missal on the grounds that the negligence claim was barred by the
Commercial Loss Doctrine due to the fact that the steel-frame system
the defendant erected was part of the same "product bargained for"
by the plaintiff.2 4 6 The plaintiff's argument, a creative one, was that
the steel frame was purchased separately from the service contract to
erect the frame and thus when the steel frame collapsed and was dam-
aged, "other property" was damaged.247 The court looked at the
purchase order between the plaintiff and the general contractor,
which stated that the general contractor was to "provide materials,
242. City of Peru, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19393, at *7.
243. Mars, Inc. v. Heritage Builders of Effingham, 763 N.E.2d 428, 431 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 432.
246. Id.
247. Id. This is a great example of how confusing the Moorman doctrine becomes when it is
applied outside the realm of product liability.
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labor, equipment, engineering, and supervision to construct a ware-
house" and to "furnish all of the materials and perform all the labor
necessary."24 8 Therefore, in the court's view, the plaintiff clearly bar-
gained for the completed warehouse, including the steel frame and the
installation service. 249
The court did point out that if "the complaint alleged the frame fell
and damaged the existing warehouse, or vehicles belonging to the
plaintiff, our analysis might be different." 25 0 The court was therefore
indicating that a party who provides only a service governed in all
aspects by a contract could still be held liable in tort if the perform-
ance of that service resulted in damage to other property. This would
in effect import product liability law into the realm of pure service
contracts, where there simply is no rational policy reason to do so.
Every aspect of risk in these settings can be freely negotiated and par-
ties can decide to include warranties, incidental and consequential
damages, indemnity provisions, etc., for the breach of a service
contract.
B. Elimination of the "Other Property" Requirement in
Construction Cases
In Board of Education of Chicago v. A, C & S, Inc., the plaintiffs, 34
school districts, pled a cause of action to recover the removal and re-
pair costs of asbestos-containing material (ACM) in their buildings
from the various defendants who were involved in the manufacturing
and distribution chain of the ACM. 251 The court found that the com-
plaints sufficiently alleged that the ACM caused damage to other
property or injury to persons required to sustain a tort claim.2 5 2 How-
ever, a plain reading of the complaint showed that there were no alle-
gations of contamination of the building and, therefore, no claim for
other property damage.253 Nonetheless, the court believed it could
make a reasonable inference from the pleadings that harmful asbestos
existed throughout the buildings.254
In making this ruling, the court greatly expanded the reach of ac-
ceptable tort claims by redefining what counts as a singular product.
The general rule is that allegations of faulty workmanship in construc-
248. Mars, 763 N.E.2d at 432.
249. Id. at 438.
250. Id. at 439.
251. 546 N.E.2d 580, 583 (Ill. 1989).
252. Id. at 591.
253. Id. at 584.
254. Id.
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tion of residencies with no allegation of physical injury or damage to
property other than to the residencies themselves will not yield dam-
ages. 2 5 5 The court pointed out that allowing recovery in this case was
a rare exception under the principles established in Moorman and
should not be construed as an invitation to bring economic loss con-
tract actions within the sphere of tort law through the use of some
fictional "other property" damage. 256 However, the court's reasoning
for allowing a tort claim in the first place was not based upon any
rational analysis of policy reasons.
C. Architects257
Four years after the Anderson258 decision, the Illinois Supreme
Court addressed the very narrow question, "[s]hould there be an ex-
ception to the rule set forth in Moorman which would permit Plaintiffs
seeking to recover purely economic losses due to defeated expecta-
tions of a commercial bargain to recover from an architect or engineer
in tort?" 259 There, the plaintiff condo association hired the defendant
architect to design condominium units.260 The plaintiff alleged that
after the units were completed, the windows and doors were loose, the
roof leaked, the garage was settling, and the utilities were inadequate
and did not function properly.261 The condo association brought suit
against the defendant on both tort and contract theories.262 The plain-
tiff did not deny that the damages were commercial, but instead ar-
gued that one of the three exceptions to the Commercial Loss
Doctrine, as outlined in Moorman, should apply.2 6 3 Until the Lincoln
Park decision, Illinois appellate courts had ruled both ways in deter-
mining whether the Commercial Loss Doctrine should bar tort claims
as applied to architects and engineers.264
255. Morrow v. L.A. Goldschmidt Associates, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 181, 185 (Ill. 1986).
256. A, C & S, 546 N.E.2d at 588.
257. For more analysis see Steven G.M. Stein et al., A Blueprint for the Duties and Liabilities
of Design Professionals After Moorman, 60 CH.-KENT L. REV. 163 (1984).
258. Anderson Elec., Inc. v. Ledbetter Erection Corp., 479 N.E.2d 476 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
259. 2314 Lincoln Park W. Condo. Ass'n v. Mann, Gin, Ebel & Frazier, Ltd., 555 N.E.2d 346,
348 (Ill. 1990).
260. Id. at 346-47.
261. Id. at 347.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 350.
264. Some decisions have allowed negligence actions against architects or engineers for purely
economic losses. See People ex rel. Skinner v. FGM, Inc., 520 N.E.2d 1024 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(action against architect); Rosos Litho Supply Corp. v. Hansen, 462 N.E.2d 566 (111. App. Ct.
1984) (action against architect); Wheeling Trust & Say. Bank v. Tremco Inc., 505 N.E.2d 1045,
1050 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (discussing Rosos). Other decisions, however, have denied recovery in
those circumstances. Tolona Pizza Products Corp. v. Davy McKee Corp., 543 N.E.2d 225 (Ill.
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First, the plaintiff attempted to make the argument that an architect
supplies information to be used by others, and therefore the claim
should come within the exception recognized in Moorman permitting
recovery of commercial losses for the torts of negligent and inten-
tional misrepresentation, both based upon extra-contractual duties.265
However, the Lincoln Park court held that:
a great many businesses involve an exchange of information as well
as of tangible products - manufacturers provide operating or as-
sembly instructions, and sellers provide warranty information of va-
rious kinds. But if we ask what the product is in each of these cases,
it becomes clear that the product (a building, precipitator, roofing
material, computer or software) is not itself information, and that
the information provided is merely incidental.266
The court seemed to concede that the duty to not intentionally or neg-
ligently make misrepresentations is an extra-contractual tort duty;
however, the court seemed to introduce another distinction which
muddies the waters more: some defendants are in the business of pro-
viding information per se and others only provide information inciden-
tal to a tangible product.267 This distinction is problematic. If a
defendant provides incidental information, but intentionally and will-
fully misrepresents that information, thus breaching a non-contractual
duty, is it recoverable in tort under the Lincoln Park holding? I do
not believe so.
App. Ct. 1989) (action against professional engineering firm and individual engineer; rejecting
Rosos); Fence Rail Dev. Corp. v. Nelson & Assoc., Ltd., 528 N.E.2d 344 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(action against architect).
265. Lincoln Park, 555 N.E.2d at 351. It is interesting that the court would use this language
given that both Soules and Rozny pre-dated the Moorman decision and thus never used the
language "Economic Loss Doctrine."
266. Id. (citing Rankow v. First Chicago Corp., 870 F.2d 356, 364 (7th Cir. 1989) (emphasis
added)).
267. Id. Keep in mind that Ronzy, Soules and Tolan highlight the distinction between those
entities that are "in the business of supplying information" from those entities that are "not
ordinarily in the business of supplying information." That is, if an entity is in the business of
supplying information it can be held liable for both intentional and negligent performance in
supplying the information. However, those entities that are not ordinarily in the business of
supplying information can only be held liable for intentional misrepresentation. (Although the
Tolan court does away with this distinction it is not an Illinois Supreme Court case.) Lincoln
Park adds another distinction, i.e., is the defendant providing information incidental to a tangen-
tial product? So now there would be four combinations of these two tests that the court would
have to analyze: (1) is the defendant ordinarily in the business of supplying information, but that
information is incidental to a finished product; (2) is the defendant ordinarily in the business of
supplying information, but that information is not incidental to a finished product; (3) is the
defendant not ordinarily in the business of supplying information but did so for this project, but
only incidentally to building a finished product; (4) is the defendant not ordinarily in the busi-
ness of supplying information but did so for this project, and it was not incidental to the finished
product?
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The second argument the plaintiff made is that architects are pro-
fessionals akin to doctors and lawyers and therefore they are bound
by extra-contractual fiduciary duties. 268 However, the court stated
that "the concept of duty is at the heart of distinction drawn by the
[commercial] loss rule," 269 and because the architect's responsibility
originated in its contract, the court found its duties should be mea-
sured accordingly. 270
In another Illinois Supreme Court case, the court reasoned that a
provider of services and its client have an important interest in being
able to establish the terms of their relationship prior to entering into a
final agreement, and "[t]he policy interest supporting the ability to
comprehensively define a relationship in a service contract parallels
the policy interest supporting the ability to comprehensively define a
relationship in a contract for the sale of goods."271 I think this is cor-
rect reasoning in the construction context when one is examining con-
tracts between builders, suppliers, owners, etc. All parties should be
in a position to allocate every type of risk in their contracts. However,
that same policy rationale does not apply to architects and engineers,
which do owe a client extra-contractual duties.
The Congregation court recognized the existence of extra-contrac-
tual duties that are the basis of tort claims, stating that the Commer-
cial Loss Doctrine should only be applicable to bar tort claims in the
service industry "where the duty of the party performing the service is
defined by the contract that he executes with his client. Where a duty
arises outside of the contract, the Commercial Loss Doctrine does not
prohibit recovery in tort for the negligent breach of that duty."272 The
Lincoln Park court also recognized that in the context of product lia-
bility law, duties do in fact arise outside of a contract, stating "[tihe
rule does not prevent a tort action to recover for injury to other prop-
erty and persons because the duty breached generally arises indepen-
dent of the contract." 273 I agree with this test, and I also agree that in
the context of construction law, most duties should be defined by the
contracts because the policy theories of construction law differ from
those of product liability law. But I do not believe that the duties
268. Lincoln Park, 555 N.E.2d at 351.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 353.
271. Congregation of the Passion v. Touche Ross & Co., 636 N.E.2d 503, 514 (111. 1994).
272. Id. at 526. This test is the basic thesis of this article and I believe it should be used by all
courts in determining when a tort duty should be viable, instead of the asking, "are the damages
economic?"
273. Lincoln Park, 555 N.E.2d at 352 (citing Flintkote Co. v. Drave Corp., 678 F.2d 942, 948
(11th Cir. 1982)).
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architects and engineers owe their clients and third parties can arise
strictly from the contract. However, that is what the plaintiff in Lin-
coln Park argued: that the duties are fiduciary and not contractual.
The Lincoln Park court seemed to acknowledge the plaintiff's argu-
ment, but then simply determined that a duty an architect owes is
strictly contractual, with no further elaboration. 274 The Lincoln Park
court contrasted architects and lawyers stating that Illinois recognizes
the fiduciary duties of lawyers as extra-contractual, but "such [ ]
dut[ies] arise[] from a consideration of the nature of the undertaking
and the lawyer's traditional responsibilities. The same cannot be said
with respect to the defendant architect in the present case." 275 This
seems to be an odd distinction.
The question the court should have asked is, "are there extra-con-
tractual duties that exist between an architect and his client or third
parties that are based on rational tort policy?" For instance, the extra-
contractual duties of product liability law are based upon public policy
concerns discussed herein, 276 and legal malpractice claims are pre-
mised on extra-contractual fiduciary duties that are based on rational
consistent tort polices also discussed herein.277 If the court had ana-
lyzed the problem in this fashion, I believe they would have come to
the conclusion that architects have extra-contractual fiduciary duties
because their clients hire them to conduct a professional service,
which per se requires exercising their professional judgment, a duty of
care that cannot be reduced to contracts. How could a client reduce
these duties to a contract when he does not have the requisite profes-
sional knowledge to even know how an architect goes about his work?
D. Engineers
The Commercial Loss Doctrine was also addressed in regards to the
services of engineers. In Ferentchak v. Village of Frankfort, the plain-
tiff home buyers brought tort claims against the defendant engineer
for negligently designing their sub-division, which lead to flooding in
their home.27 8 The water entered the home because the foundation
grade level was too low. 2 7 9 In the contractual privity chain the land
274. Id. It should also be acknowledged that the Lincoln Park test seems tautological, i.e., the
plaintiff argues that the tort claim should be allowed because an architect's duty arises extra-
contractually, but the court responds by saying that we can tell what duties arise between an
architect and his client based upon the contract they have with one another.
275. Id. at 318.
276. See supra Part II.
277. See supra Part IV.
278. 475 N.E.2d 822, 823 (Ill. 1985).
279. Id.
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developer engaged the engineer to design plans, so there was no priv-
ity between the homebuyer and the engineer. Therefore, the plaintiffs
bought a tort claim against the engineer alleging that the engineer's
duty arose from his professional responsibility as a registered civil
engineer.280
The Ferentchak court held that the "degree of skill and care re-
quired of [the engineer] in this situation is dependant on his contrac-
tual obligation to [the developer]," and "[t]he scope of that duty,
although based upon tort rather than contract, is nevertheless defined
by the engineer's . . . contract with the owner." 281 The evidence
presented at trial showed that foundation grade elevations were not
set by the contracts and therefore the engineer did not have a duty to
the plaintiff. 28 2 The Ferentchak court is stating that an engineer's du-
ties stem from their contracts, whereas the plaintiff was trying to ar-
gue that there are extra-contractual duties, such as fiduciary duties,
that are above and beyond mere contractual and most traditional tort
duties. However, the Ferentchak court refused to create fiduciary du-
ties for engineers.283
Compare the Ferentchak holding to Thompson v. Gordon, where a
contract contained a provision stating that "[t]he standard of care for
[defendants'] services will be the degree of skill and diligence nor-
mally employed by professional engineers or consultants performing
the same or similar services." 284 The court pointed out that such a
provision added an important qualifier to the defendants' work be-
cause it obligated them to act within the prescribed standard of
care.285 The contract's articulation of the standard of care matches
the standard of care generally applied to professionals under Illinois
law, which is to use the "same degree of knowledge, skill and ability as
an ordinarily careful professional would exercise under similar
circumstances." 286
The Thompson trial court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the ground that the contract, which controlled defend-
280. Id. at 826. The plaintiffs pointed to decisions of the Illinois appellate courts which re-
quired that engineers exercise the degree of care and skill ordinarily required of other civil engi-
neers in the community. See, e.g., Mississippi Meadows, Inc. v. Hudson, 299 N.E.2d 359, 364 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1973); Bates & Rogers Constr. Corp. v. N. Shore Sanitary Dist., 414 N.E.2d 1274 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1981).
281. Ferentchak, 475 N.E.2d at 826 (quoting Bates & Rogers Constr. Corp. v. N. Shore Sani-
tary Dist., 414 N.E.2d 1274, 1280 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)).
282. Ferentchak, 475 N.E.2d at 826.
283. Id.
284. 923 N.E.2d 808, 811 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
285. Id. at 814.
286. See Advincula v. United Blood Services, 678 N.E.2d 1009, 1020 (Ill. 1996).
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ants' duties, "[did] not call for an assessment of the sufficiency of the
median barrier" because there was no express provision in the con-
tract to do so. 2 87 However, the appellate court held that the defend-
ants' contract obligated them to "employ a professional standard of
care in designing a replacement for the bridge deck, and the expert's
affidavit was evidence that the defendants breached that standard of
care by not considering or designing an improved median barrier." 288
The Illinois Supreme Court recently accepted review of the Thomp-
son case 289 and it is an interesting case in that the appellate court held
engineers to a professional standard of care just like attorneys and
accountants, but it also comports with the Ferentchak decision in that
the tort duty only arose because it was a provision of the contract.
The Illinois Supreme Court should take the opportunity to hold archi-
tects and engineers to the same standard that lawyers and accountants
are held to. Architects and engineers clearly have extra-contractual
duties that cannot be reduced to the terms of a contract because they
are professionals that are responsible for exercising professional judg-
ment in the design of structures. How could each professional judg-
ment be reduced to a contract? Is the owner required to have the
requisite knowledge of what needs to be designed and it what manner
to put it in the contract? This is clearly not the case. Architects and
engineers are hired to exercise their professional judgment in the de-
sign of structures, and thus they should be held to a professional stan-
dard of care whether it is placed in a contract or not. This is clearly an
extra-contractual duty.
VI. DAMAGEs RECOVERABLE
The definition of "economic loss" usually includes direct, incidental
and consequential damages.290 Direct damages are the cost of the
product itself, which can be determined by the difference between the
price paid and the market value of the product as defective.291 Eco-
nomic loss also includes incidental damages such as the cost of repair
287. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 812.
288. Id. at 816. In his dissent, Justice Hutchinson felt that the defendants' task was to provide
plans to rebuild the "bridge deck and median as they then existed, with the degree of skill and
diligence normally employed by a professional engineer, but nowhere does this extend to include
a requirement that defendant redesign the bridge deck to include a jersey barrier." Id. at 821.
However, this reasoning misses the point that it is the engineer that is retained to exercise his
professional judgment and know that such barriers may be needed to safely construct the bridge.
This extra-contractual duty is akin to duties lawyers have to their clients.
289. 932 N.E.2d 1037.
290. U.C.C. § 2-715 (2004).
291. Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Consequential Damages for Commercial Loss: An
Alternative to Hadley v. Baxendale, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 665, 667-68 (1994).
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or replacement of the defective product, and consequential damages
which are the lost profits from delay and replacement. 292 Whether one
can recover for the direct, incidental, and consequential damages aris-
ing from the product itself or only for the direct, incidental, and conse-
quential damages to the "other property" has not yet been
determined in Illinois. It is a very important question because a plain-
tiff could sustain large damages from a defective product, including
costs of repair and lost profits, but only very minor damages to other
property. Should the plaintiff be able to recover all of the damages?
It does not seem to make sense under the principles articulated in
Moorman to allow recovery for physical harm to the product and lost
profits caused by the harm to the product, even if there is damage to
other property via a sudden event. This is because the damage to the
product is still only economic loss; it is the damage to other property
that brings the claim within the realm of tort theory. However, in
American Xyrofn, the appellate court held that "[w]e are unable to
find support for the defendants' contention that even if a sudden and
calamitous occurrence resulting in damage to surrounding property
were shown to exist, recovery for damages to the [product itself] and
lost profits would nevertheless be unrecoverable in tort."293 In fact,
the American Xyrofln court held that "recovery should include dam-
ages for any harm which proximately resulted from defendants'
breach of their duty including damage to the [product] and lost
profits."294
Given this holding, it will be in the plaintiff's attorney's best interest
to look for any damage to other surrounding property, however slight,
in conjunction with the failure of the product in order to bypass the
economic loss rule and allow for recovery in tort. Once the plaintiff
has found damage to other property, he can then seek recovery for the
other property along with the damage caused to the product itself and
any incidental and consequential damages that resulted from the loss
of use of the product itself. Let's take an example ad absurdum. Con-
sider a plaintiff that owned a $1 million piece of equipment that broke
down and shot a screw out that hit the plaintiff, resulting in a trip to
the hospital, but only a few stitches and a $2,000.00 medical bill. Be-
cause of the damage to the equipment, the plaintiff had to shut down
his business for two weeks and therefore lost $100,000.00 in net prof-
its. Under the American Xyrofln holding, the plaintiff could recover
all $1,102,000.00, in tort, because the Commercial Loss Doctrine
292. Id.
293. Am. Xyrofin, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 595 N.E.2d 650, 657-58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
294. Id. at 673 (emphasis added).
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would not bar the claim. This is an absurd outcome. There is no
doubt that the plaintiff should be able to recover his $2,000.00 medical
bill in tort, but the additional $1,100,000.00 should be governed by the
contractual terms and warranties between the plaintiff and the manu-
facturer of the equipment.
VII. CONCLUSION
Given the confusion that the Commercial Loss Doctrine has caused
in Illinois, I believe that when Illinois courts are called upon to deter-
mine whether the Commercial Loss Doctrine applies, they should not
begin by applying the traditional Moorman test, i.e., is the damage to
other property via a sudden a calamitous event. Instead, they should
analyze whether the duties between the parties arise via the contract
between the parties or via extra-contractual duties which govern the
relationship between the parties. If the latter, then tort claims should
be allowed. In determining whether extra-contractual duties exist,
courts must articulate rational and/or historical policy reasons for the
existence of such duties, not just a preference for justice.
I also hope I have shown that the Commercial Loss Doctrine should
be applied to bar tort claims in the construction industry because the
policy reasons for allowing tort claims do not apply in the construction
industry, with the exception of claims against architects and engineers.
This is due to the fact that the policy rationale for product liability
claims, which is to put the risk of loss on the manufacturer who is in
the best place to prevent the defect and also in the best position to
insure against the same, simply does not apply to the construction in-
dustry. This is the case even when the construction involves a single
family home purchased by unsophisticated buyers. This is because
construction contracts are not consummated in the same way and with
the frequency that product sales are in a mass market global economy.
That is, every time a building is constructed, all parties, including the
owners, developers, architects, engineers, purchasers and subcontrac-
tors, are sophisticated parties that retain counsel, or should retain
counsel, to review contracts for risk of loss and risk shifting. There is
every opportunity, by every party involved, to allocate the risk of all
events, even sudden and calamitous events that result in injuries to
person or other property. Tort claims against architects and engineers
should be allowed because these parties must exercise professional
judgment in designing plans: it is an extra-contractual duty that the
client cannot reduce to the terms of a contract.
Unless courts are ready to drop all distinctions between contract
claims and tort claims, which would be a grave mistake, courts need to
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make an effort to clarify the Moorman doctrine and its application,
and define certain workable rules to provide practitioners guidance in
litigating these claims.
